Civil Society Strengthening Program

Mid-term Evaluation

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Contents

ANNEXES

Executive Summary

This report constitutes the mid-term evaluation of the Civil Society Strengthening Program (CSSP), which has been operating under a contract with USAID/Jakarta's Civic Participation and Transition (CPT) team since the fall of 1999. A large program by USAID democracy standards ($27 million LOP funding anticipated), CSSP's principal purpose has been "assisting emerging, reform-minded non-governmental organizations (NGOs [more commonly referred to within CSSP and CPT as civil society organizations or CSOs]) address key issues associated with increased openness, transparency and reform." Begun as a national effort, CSSP changed to a provincial canvas in mid-2000 in accord with the USAID Mission's new Country Strategy Paper issued at that time. Since then, it has concentrated on six provinces; among them the review team was able to visit two more mature programs in East Java and Papua, as well as the newer provincial efforts in East Kalimantan. In addition, CSSP has continued to support a number of national-level activities initiated in its original mandate; the team also visited some of these enterprises.

The political environment faced by CSSP was a daunting one. For more than three decades the Suharto regime had occupied almost all the political space occupied by civil society in more democratic systems, meaning that CSSP had to begin for the most part by supporting brand-new organizations unacquainted with formulating strategies, managing financial flows, monitoring performance, etc. In **Papua** this general problematic was compounded by a military occupation focused on exploiting the province's natural resources and repressing the local population, both of which activities have entailed significant illegal behavior and violence. Conflict reduction accordingly forms the major challenge for civil society to deal with. With its huge (34 million) population, **East Java** stands at center stage of Indonesia's ambitious decentralization initiative launched in 1999. The province, its 29 kabupaten, 8 independent kota (cities) and thousands of villages were all outfitted with elected legislatures and executive bodies, but these structures lack any real experience in managing their affairs, so it made sense for CSSP to focus its program on local governance. As a vast storehouse of natural resource wealth, **East Kalimantan** has attracted waves of transmigrants from elsewhere in the country, creating problems with environmental exploitation, labor conditions and the local *adat* (indigenous) population, all of which informed CSSP's program there.

Program components

CSSP has had four main components or Program Objectives (POs), each of which the review team analyzed. In all cases the team found that CSSP had met and in some cases exceeded the results targets set for Year 3 of the contract. **PO1** comprises **analysis, articulation and effective advocacy for policy reform**; it thus constitutes CSSP's major "end product" impacting the political system as a whole. Accordingly, we have devoted more analysis to it than to the other POs.

The team suggests appraising CSO performance for PO1 by employing an "advocacy ladder" consisting of three stages and seven tiers or rungs; the initial two stages and six rungs are relevant for this report. In the first or **participatory stage**, a CSO engages in *mobilizing* constituents, creating a *voice* for its cause, and *representing* its constituency to the state; these three achievements comprise the first three rungs of the ladder. In the second or **accountability stage**, the state finds itself successively having to justify its behavior by becoming more *transparent*,

then granting at least some of the group's demands or *empowering* it, and finally in conferring *benefits* to the constituency – the next three rungs of the ladder. CSOs themselves can be divided into two basic groups, of which the first, consisting of constituency-based and membership-based organizations (actually two sub-types here), deals with all the advocacy ladder's rungs. The second type comprises "trustee" organizations, organized and led by elites acting (or claiming to act) on behalf of a reference group that cannot act on its own. They in effect skip the first two rungs of the advocacy ladder and operate on the next four (from representation through constituency benefits). Farmers' groups are characteristic of the first type, while victims of human rights abuses offer an example of the second.

Not surprisingly, given Indonesia's early position on the democratization trajectory, only three of the 16 CSOs (10 sectoral and six local) illustrated in this report are membership-based, while fully 13 are trustee types, though three of the latter are branching out, two toward energizing constituencies and one toward building a membership. Most (11) of the CSOs have had some impact at the representation rung of the advocacy ladder, while a few (five) have had some success in promoting transparency. Three have attained at least a degree of empowerment, and one has actually obtained some concrete constituency benefits. To be sure, these achievements need some discounting. The one instance of constituency benefits proved to be temporary, for example, and most of the transparency successes reflected isolated instances or potentials for action rather than action itself.

Even so, when viewed against the long historical backdrop of an unresponsive state, these cases of gaining a grip on the advocacy ladder's rungs represent a significant achievement and one that would have not happened or at best taken a lot longer in the absence of a program like CSSP. The ladder, then, facilitates laying out an assessment of CSO impact attainment. It also possesses a prescriptive quality, in helping advise a CSO where it might next direct its efforts, either upward or downward on the ladder. For example, the complaint center created at the instance of another CSO (transparency on the ladder) could develop methods of pressing local authorities for redress (empowerment), thus moving upward. Or the CSO attaining benefits for the constituency it represented might be encouraged to energize that potential base to secure the benefits in future on a more enduring basis, thus moving down on the ladder.

The media make up an additional component of PO1, not in the sense of a strategic program element but rather in the form of discrete support activities to promising organizations. Their most notable work consisted of "watch" monitoring efforts aimed at press freedom and human rights issues. Several CSSP-assisted institutions also monitored the press's own activities.

PO2 seeks to **improve effective administrative management and planning** among CSO grantees, a goal often referred to more simply as "capacity building." Using both one-on-one assistance with individual CSOs and workshops involving groups of them, CSSP has established a three-phase process to strengthen financial management, beginning with pre-grant assessment and following on to continual post-grant monitoring. Through similar means it has also provided training on planning, personnel management, organizational self-assessment, monitoring, policy analysis, etc. Given the very rudimentary skills most Indonesian CSOs possessed just after the democratic transition, building these capacities has taken a great deal of work, for which CSSP deserves much credit.

PO3 calls for **building sustainability for CSOs, especially in terms of generating financial resources**. Primarily this has meant grantees securing funding from other donors, and the grant-

ees supported by CSSP have more than met the Year 3 target in this regard. Part of the reason why they have been able to do so is to be found in CSSP's grant-making process, which has compelled CSOs to build skills in the arts needed to win grants from other donors. This initial training was then followed up with other efforts including individual guidance and workshops to improve fund-raising. In addition, some grantees have begun pursuing plans to generate income from their own activities, such as publications.

PO4 sets its target as **grants to Indonesian NGOs awarded and managed effectively**, to number 10-15 per year. Critical to attaining this level has been the grant awarding process, which has winnowed 44 grants so far from some 1,500 applications submitted, more than meeting the contract benchmark. This sifting process has involved a great deal of guidance through workshops as well as individual counseling to bring potential grantees up to the required standard in terms of writing proposals, setting up operational plans, demonstrating financial management capacity, arranging monitoring and reporting procedures, and the like – all skills almost completely absent during the New Order era. Assimilating these proficiencies has been hard work for most grantees and has generated much complaining, but it has markedly upgraded their professionalism as CSOs.

A fifth CSSP component has been the **Special Activities Fund** (SAF), a special mechanism intended to support short-term, discrete and event-based activities in response to demands arising in the course of program implementation. By the time of our review, just over half the funding allotted to the SAF had been spent on activities mostly in support of POs 1, 2 and 3, but also for some initiatives cutting across SO sectors. Its benefits for CSSP were to facilitate add-on endeavors like extra workshops for grantees and to publicize CSSP to the larger universe of CSOs in Indonesia, some of whom then successfully applied for grants.

Major issues for USAID/Jakarta.

In the middle of its third week of work, the review team presented its initial findings to the USAID Mission, which expressed strong interest in a number of new issues, which the team then incorporated into its report.

1. CSO survival at EOP. Many things militate against CSO survival: the very novelty of civil society itself in the post-Suharto era; the likely ephemeral qualities of the youthful idealism so characteristic of CSO leadership; the short-term nature of most CSSP grants (making longer mentorship more difficult); a national government somewhat less supportive of civil society than its immediate predecessors; the probable decline of public enthusiasm for democratic participation as the 1998 transition recedes into the past, and finally a predicted decrease of significant proportions in USAID funding in the next year or two. Other factors provide more reason for hope: the Yayasan (foundation) law of 2000; the presence of other donors; potential within committed NGOs for belt-tightening, and possibilities for income-generating activities like commercial sales.

2. Comparative advantage. Though the review team was unable to make systematic comparisons, it did find that CSSP had done very well indeed in three particular areas: nurturing embryonic NGOs to become grantworthy; helping them build strong financial management systems; and assisting them to develop advocacy skills.

3. Prioritizing for a legacy. The probable cutback in funding now anticipated during the remaining LOP will constrain CSSP's reach, but it should nonetheless be feasible to build on the program's core elements to establish a legacy with three components: (i) a coherent community of CSOs well on the road to institutionalization and focusing on human rights and conflict reduction in Papua and Aceh, and a similarly robust CSO community concentrating on local governance issues in East Java; (ii) an institutionalized ability to build CSO capacity; and (iii) a stronger media.

4. Institutionalizing capacity building. A developed and sustainable capacity to provide expertise, counseling and training to CSOs – what might be called technical assistance for civil society – should become a high priority for CSSP in its remaining LOP. Several Indonesian NGOs would appear to have the potential for such a role, and they should be encouraged to take it on, perhaps with the cooperation of other SO teams at USAID/Jakarta.

5. Coordination among CSSP grantees. The venture CSSP has begun in East Java called Matching Issues, Resources, People and Priorities (MIRPP) should be nurtured. This low-cost, networking approach endeavors to match needs with resources/people/skills among CSSP grantees.

6. Coordination among SOs. USAID missions generally want more linkage between their SO teams, but this has proven an elusive goal in most places. Our field observations in East Java and Papua failed to find much coordination there either, perhaps because as elsewhere there is little incentive in the USAID system for either mission staff or contractors to pay much attention to each other. This could change, but it would take a determined will at the director's level.

7. Balance between PO2 (building capacity among present grantees) **and PO4** (funding new grantees). The very strong probability that CSSP funding will soon be reduced renders this query effectively moot. New grants will become successively fewer (though those currently in the pipeline should get funded), so available CSSP energies should go to PO4.

8. Building model provincial programs. Present programming trajectories will leave in place at LOP a number of impressive individual CSOs in operation, but no more than that. If the overall legacy is to be more than the sum of its parts, a concerted effort will be needed to build a coherent, purposeful and sustainable civil society presence at provincial level. In Papua (and making necessary adaptations Aceh as well) this effort should focus on human rights and conflict reduction. The first task would be to select a lead CSO to become a coordinating umbrella organization and then to strengthen it to provide technical assistance to the civil society community in the province. In East Java, the focus would be on building a model local governance model, and a similar approach would be called for in identifying and strengthening a lead CSO to provide leadership to the wider organizational community.

9. Modifying the contract (we added this issue, as it is implied by our recommendations on the other issues). If CSSP's remaining energies are to be redirected toward creating a civil society program legacy in the three provinces and toward institutionalizing civil society capacity building, the present contract would have to be modified for all for POs in terms of expected results.

Recommendations

Strategy. These recommendations pertain to basic program direction – what we believe should be its core focus over remaining LOP. Implementation will require action from both CPT and CSSP in all three cases.

- **Creating a program legacy (priority 1).** It is time to pull together CSSP's experience at building civil society into coherent strategies that can form its legacy. The three provinces of Papua, Aceh and East Java offer an excellent opportunity for crafting three provincial strategic designs – the first two based on human rights and conflict reduction, and the third on local governance.
- **Institutionalizing civil society capacity building (priority 2).** Specific CSOs should be identified and assisted to become providers of TA to the civil society community in such areas as strategic planning, financial management, advocacy and the like. This is our second priority for strategic programming over the remaining LOP (See
- **Maintaining media support (priority 3).** A free media will remain critical to maintaining democracy in Indonesia, and support for it should be continue.

Organization and management. The first of these recommendations applies to CSSP itself, the second to USAID/Jakarta and the third to relations between these two bodies.

- **Coordination among grantees.** Grantees both present and former should be encouraged to share experience and expertise in a structured fashion. The embryonic start made with MIRPP should be pushed ahead into actuality and expanded.
- **Coordination among SOs.** USAID/Jakarta can realize significant economies of scale through coordinating parallel efforts among the SO teams working with NGOs in such areas as financial management, workplan development, etc. The CPT SO team might take the lead in sharing advocacy expertise with others. But for coordination initiatives to succeed, leadership from the top would be required.
- **Modifying the contract.** Refashioning the POs in the ways recommended here would necessitate modifying the contract.

Operational level. Our last set of recommendations concerns how CSSP conducts its business and keeps track of how it does so. The first two pertain to CSSP, the last one to both CPT and CSSP.

- **Selecting grantees.** To the extent that new grantees can be supported after present pipeline CSOs are funded, a change of direction in determining them will be called for. To find lead CSOs for the provincial programs and civil society service providers at the national level, CSSP will have to identify grantees and solicit proposals for specific activities rather than let potential grantees find it.
- **Outreach efforts.** CSSP should be encouraged to increase its efforts at developing websites, publishing case study collections, guidebooks, newsbulletins, etc.
- **The advocacy ladder.** We hope the advocacy ladder will prove a useful tool for gauging the progress of the civil society program in its final two years as well as for planning its programming initiatives for specific CSOs.

I. Introduction

Overview

The Civil Society Strengthening Program (CSSP) formally began in autumn 1999 as a three-year contract (soon extended to five years) with the purpose of "assisting emerging, reform-minded non-governmental organizations (NGOs) address key issues associated with increased openness, transparency and reform" (Contract, p 2). In terms of total funding, the program anticipated spending just over $27 million over the course of its five-year lifetime – a large-scale effort by democracy programming standards within USAID. The CSSP consortium implementing the contract consists of several entities: Chemonics International has been the lead member or prime contractor, allied with four sub-contractors, of which CARE and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) have been the two major implementors.[1] CSSP started out with a largely national focus, but then changed course significantly in mid-2000 with the emergence of the USAID Mission's new Country Strategy Paper issued in May of that year. The revised approach kept the same overall goals and objectives, but changed the venue to concentrate on six provinces – Aceh, East Java, East Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, Papua and West Java.

A second CSSP feature involved the unusually tight management control exercised by the USAID Mission's Civic Participation and Transition (CPT) team, its implementing entity for Strategic Objective (SO) 7 – an arrangement that engendered some teething difficulties for CSSP. Over time, as CPT and CSSP became more comfortable with each other and personnel changed on both sides, the relationship attained a surer footing and by early 2002 appeared to be moving along smoothly, meeting and even exceeding the benchmark targets set for it in the contract.

It had been decided to conduct a mid-term evaluation of the program in early 2002, but for various reasons this was postponed until the summer of the same year. A Scope of Work (SOW) was drawn up by CPT and a contract awarded to Management Systems International (MSI) of Washington, DC, which recruited a review team. As the review team began its work at the beginning of July, the Mission modified the SOW to include more attention to program impact issues, some consideration of directly supported CPT civil society efforts (i.e., civil society activities funded by CPT but outside the ambit of CSSP) and some observation of USAID-assisted advocacy activity in other SO sectors (these latter two foci were intended to provide a "360°" dimension to the evaluation.

The review team studied documents, visited three provincial field sites, interviewed key informants at a wide variety of civil society organizations (CSOs)[2], and conducted several focus groups, all leading to a presentation to the USAID Mission Director and staff on 24 July, followed by writing up a draft report by the beginning of August. The 24 July review requested the team to devote additional special attention *inter alia* to how best to assure a significant legacy

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[1] The two other sub-contractors are International Development Professionals (IDP), and the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), but they have played only minor roles thus far. Except for the CARE City Forum initiative centered in East Java, CSSP has operated as a joint entity between Chemonics, CARE and IFES, with Chemonics taking the lead role. The review team has assessed the program as such, not attempting to evaluate it on a contractor-by-contractor basis.

[2] The terms CSO and NGO appear to be used interchangeably for the most part within USAID/Jakarta and CSSP itself, following general practice within the Agency, although at times a (usually implicit) distinction is made between CSOs as a special type of organization within the wider NGO community.

after EOP that would strengthen Indonesian civil society on a sustainable basis. This report embodies the review team's findings, analysis and recommendations on all these dimensions. These several additional evaluation tasks necessitated consolidating the original SOWs quite substantial agenda so that the review team could manage both older and newer assignments with the resources available. As we have done so, we have endeavored to address the questions and issues of most importance to the Mission; we hope we have succeeded in this regard.

The report outlined. Our report consists of five main chapters. In addition to the overview presented here, the first chapter goes on to explain the review team's composition and methodology and then provide some background on the evolution of CSSP as a program and the political context or environment within which it operates. The second chapter reviews CSSP's four Performance Objectives (POs) and the Special Activities Fund (SAF) in terms of their progress at this 2½ year mark. Our third chapter focuses on specific CSSP and USAID Mission management issues noted in the Scope of Work (SOW) for this evaluation. The fourth chapter offers our analysis of some eight issues that emerged as key in the discussion following the team's presentation of its findings at USAID/Jakarta on 24 July 2002, and the last chapter sums up our principal recommendations. Our report also includes several annexes. The first provides a list of the many acronyms used in the report, while the second lists our calendar of activities and interviews. The third annex comprises the Scope of Work guiding our evaluation, and a final fourth annex provides a list of references used in our work.

Acknowledgements. The review team benefited greatly from CSSP's enthusiastic willingness to share its facilities and even more so its expertise with us. Everyone at CSSP, from Chief of Party Peter Harris to the office assistants and drivers very graciously accommodated our (we hope mostly reasonable) requests and made our work flow smoothly, both at the home office in Jakarta and in the field. At USAID/Jakarta, Robert Hansen, the CTO for the review, along with CPT team leader Mike Calavan (succeeded by acting leader Dana Peterson) provided much sound advice and guidance as we moved along. And finally, without our very capable and energetic interpreter Maggie Horhoruw, we would have been both lost and clueless on our field visit to Papua. We are most grateful to all of them.

Review team composition and methodology

The team. The CSSP mid-term evaluation team consisted of four persons working under contract to Management Systems International (MSI), of Washington, DC. They were:

- Harry Blair, who served as team leader, is Senior Research Scholar and Lecturer in Political Science at Yale University and has worked during much of the 1990s as Senior Democracy Specialist at USAID Washington in PPC/CDIE and DCHA/DG (most recently under contract to MSI), focusing on civil society.

- Leonardo Dayao recently retired after 18 years as a Foreign Service National at USAID/Manila, where among other assignments he served as Project Manager and Cognizant Technical Officer of the Governance and Local Democracy (GOLD) Project.

- Azwar Hasan has worked as an independent consultant on a wide range of donor-assisted development activities in Indonesia, including recently a final evaluation CLEAN

URBAN, a predecessor to CSSP. He is also a lecturer in local governance studies at the University of Indonesia.

- Roy Salomo, a specialist and consultant in local governance, has worked with numerous development projects focusing on citizen participation, local public finance, and decentralization policy. In addition, he serves as a lecturer in public finance at the University of Indonesia.

Methodology. The Scope of Work for this evaluation, included as an annex to this report, called for a four-person team to spend approximately four weeks' level of effort in Indonesia to conduct the necessary research, field study and analysis. An ambitious assignment, the SOW (see Annex 3) set forth some 113 questions under 38 major headings spread among 9 topics. In the course of our initial briefing at USAID/Jakarta on 3 July, the Mission modified the SOW along the following lines, asking for:

- More concerted attention to demonstrable program *impact*.
- Greater focus on *depth*, if necessary at the expense of fuller coverage of CSSP's various facets and program locales.
- A more "360°"-oriented review, specifically to include illustrative analysis of *other USAID-assisted civil society support efforts* outside of those supported by CSSP, in particular of two kinds –
     -- activities directly funded by CPT; and
     -- initiatives supported by other SO teams within the Mission.

With these additional instructions in mind, the review team set to work immediately on 4 July, setting as our first task beyond initial briefings with the CSSP staff the selection of areas for field visits. Given the rich array of provinces and program themes that had been taken up by CSSP, as shown in Table 1, this proved a difficult task. But after considerable deliberation and guidance from both CSSP and CPT, we opted for three sites among the six in Table 1, two of the three more mature provinces where CSSP efforts had been in place for some time, and one of the three newer provinces more characterized by startup activity:

Table 1. CSSP regional & thematic focus

Papua	**Conflict reduction, human rights, adat community**
East Java	**Local governance, civic participation**
East Kalimantan	**Labor, local governance, adat community**
Aceh	Conflict reduction, human rights, women & children
North Sulawesi	Local governance, environment, civic participation
West Java	Local governance, transparency

Boldface indicates province selected for review team visit.

- *Papua* features a combination of natural resource wealth, a significant (though probably not majority) portion of the indigenous population favoring secession, and military repression and violence against civilians. It is abundantly clear why conflict resolution, human rights and indigenous community culture are CSSP's major thematic concerns in this province. The review team spent a week in Papua, mostly in the capital at Jayapura but also including a two-day side trip to Merauke on the southern coast of the island.

- In contrast to the conflict and violence occurring in provinces like Papua, Aceh and Maluku, *East Java* is relatively calm and so more typical of most of the country. At the same time, its huge population (34 million, or about 15 percent of the national total, roughly comparable to California's place in the Unites States) makes it vital to Indonesia's future. Sustainable development in East Java will require serious investment in and close attention to the province's 8 independent kota and 29 kabupaten along with their kecamatan, which makes CSSP's provincial focus on local governance and citizen participation most apt. This province also had more programs in place and pipeline than any other, making it additionally attractive as a place for the team to visit. In addition to Surabaya, the provincial capital, the team visited CSSP-supported activities in kabupaten Sidoarjo, Mojokerto, Malang, Pamekasan, Lamongan and Tuban.
- Among the three newer provincial programs, *East Kalimantan* had the most programs already operational or in the pipeline, as well as representing another part of the country that would provide additional coverage. Here the team visited the provincial capital at Balikpapan and kabupaten Samarinda.

We feel compelled to state that the provinces selected are illustrative of CSSP's provincial initiatives; they cannot be held to accurately and completely reflect the entire six-province program. Experiences in Aceh or North Sulawesi, for instance, may well be quite different from those we observed. But given our time and personnel constraints (plus the Mission's injunction to seek as much depth as possible), we could not visit all six. We hope our sample of three has provided enough variation to make our conclusions reasonably valid.

We should also point out that our evidence on impact is or the most part indirect, consisting mainly of assertions and claims, by grantees and subgrantees. In some cases corroborating evidence emerged,[3] but mainly we had to content ourselves with less than complete verification. To have tracked down every claim of impact to the point of proof would have taken far more time and personnel than the review team had available.

In addition to the provincial programs, we met CSOs in Jakarta and Jogjakarta engaged in national programs and thus were able to get some understanding of this earlier and still continuing CSSP focus.

Within these parameters, our data gathering effort comprised the following components:

- Interviews with CPT and CSSP staff;
- Document review of materials from both these sources, as well as selected others (mainly reports and papers received from CSSP grantees and other donors)[4];
- Field visits to East Java, Papua and East Kalimantan, as well as to Jogjakarta.
- Interviews (see the list in the annex to this report) with:
    -- 34 CSSP grantees and subgrantees;
    -- 4 non-CSSP USAID grantees;
    -- 5 other entities (4 government officials and 1 informal interfaith religious group of leaders);

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[3] For example, enough people from different quarters mentioned a produce vendors' demonstration sponsored by a grantee in Jayapura that we were reasonably sure it in fact occurred.
[4] The CSSP quarterly reports and annual reports, as well as its two internal assessments (Merschrod 2000) and Mintz (2002) were particularly helpful to the review team.

   -- 3 other donors.
- Three focus group sessions.

These activities consumed the first three weeks of our review, followed by a presentation at USAID on 24 July, at which the USAID Mission asked the team to focus on several additional lines of inquiry, as listed at the beginning of our Chapter IV. The team then turned to writing the report, with special attention to the new questions posed at the 24 July meeting. A first full draft was submitted to the CPT on 2 August 2002, to which the Mission responded in mid-August. This second draft takes into account those comments and constitutes the team's final version, to which CSSP will provide comments. The report along with the CSSP comments (included as a supplement at the report's end) then will become the final product for the mid-term evaluation of CSSP.

The working environment CSSP faces

To gauge the progress of CSSP, it is necessary to gain some understanding of the working environment within which the program has been operating. The very brief analysis here is accordingly intended to provide a skeletal outline of democratization's major contextual features in Indonesia, first at the national level, then for CSSP's two more mature provincial programs in Papua and East Java, and finally for the more recent initiatives taken up in East Kalimantan.

   The national backdrop.[5]

The most salient reality for civil society in Indonesia today is the constraining dead weight of the New Order's legacy. Over the course of more than three decades, the Suharto regime effectively occupied almost all of the political space inhabited by civil society in democratic political systems elsewhere. The citizen groups that represent people's wants and needs to the state in other countries were for the most part either preempted by state-sponsored bodies in Indonesia or did not exist in any meaningful form. Even the service delivery NGOs found in many other non-democratic countries were largely absent on the Indonesian scene.[6] Grassroots community groups existed at the village or neighborhood level, often providing essential services like rotating credit societies, but they did not aggregate upward to larger groups to any significant extent. The net result is that civil society had to start essentially from scratch.

It is instructive the compare Indonesia with the Philippines in 1986, where in effect an interrupted project could be resumed after an authoritarian interregnum. Once the Marcos dictatorship had been ousted, people could go back to the civil society activities they had engaged in an earlier democratic dispensation before martial law's imposition in 1972. Many of these enterprises had been carried on underground anyhow, while for others old leaders could resume where they had left off and new leaders easily found mentors with experience to pass on.

By contrast in Indonesia, the CSOs starting operations after the Suharto overthrow in 1998 were basically brand-new creations, largely devoid of any ability to craft strategies, write proposals, construct workplans, assemble budgets, monitor progress, etc. Many were begun for idealistic

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[5] Many of the observations here are taken from Paul McCarthy's insightful paper, "A Thousand Flowers Blooming" (March 2002).
[6] Such institutions were not completely missing, e.g., the Islamic school system, and of course the huge Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) association headed by Gus Dur.

reasons by educated younger people willing to subsidize their own efforts by working long hours for low wages, although some of the new CSOs bursting forth appear to be in some measure alternative engagements for recent university graduates unable to find longer term employment in a slack economy. In such circumstances, it is small wonder that so large a proportion of CSSP management time has had to be devoted to making these fledgling CSOs grantworthy.

A closely allied issue comes from the pervasive corruption so endemic at all levels in Indonesia. Widely denounced as KKN (*korupsi kolusi nepotisme*), it is practiced by both civilian and military wings of the government, at national and provincial levels alike. KKN seriously reduces government efficiency and effectiveness, but even more important from the civil society perspective, the corruption tends to render the state unaccountable to citizen input as it becomes instead more accountable to the sources of the venality. Corruption, in short, acts as a kind of preventive filter on citizen inputs to government at every level.

Political will at the topmost levels, usually a critical factor in whatever success civil society initiatives have enjoyed elsewhere, became at least modestly available in the form of press freedom, liberty to organize, etc., during the interim Habibie government that followed the downfall of Suharto. In the succeeding administration, Gus Dur himself embodied civil society as the head of NU, appointed several civil society leaders to important cabinet posts, and opened government further to public scrutiny. The Megawati government taking over in mid-2001 has not rolled back the basic freedoms gained under Habibie and Gus Dur, but her government has become more secretive, more protective of the "political class," and more willing to give the military a freer hand in such troublesome places as Aceh and Papua. Civil society leaders have not enjoyed the same access to the state that they previously had, human rights tribunals have stalled, and support in general for civil society has assumed a lower pitch.

In addition to these constraints, Indonesia's sheer size makes a national-level civil society initiative an especially daunting one. Among all the countries receiving USAID democracy assistance, only Russia begins to approach Indonesia's population, and only Russia exceeds Indonesia's vast geographical size.[7] Even the relatively large USAID allocations to Indonesia beginning after Suharto's fall were unlikely to effect any fundamental and lasting changes in the polity that had been constructed over such a long time. The USAID Mission was surely on target with its 2000 Country Strategy Paper observation that the "Agency alone cannot leverage reform in Indonesia" (p 4). The switch to more manageable (if still very ambitious) selected provincial programs was a wise one, and its perspicacity has been borne out by subsequent macro-political developments.

Provincial level.

As with the macro-level polity, so too some backgrounding is required to understand and assess CSSP's provincial programming efforts. Each of the three provinces visited by the review team had particular governance problems, which are very briefly explored below and as is implied by the differing program foci shown in Table 1.

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[7] India has had some small democracy components in its USAID activities, but nothing like the DG programming efforts in Indonesia or Russia.

Conflict in Papua. The picture presented here represents what the review team has learned about the political situation in Papua,[8] but with some changes (particularly with respect to ethnicity and religion) much the same could be said of Aceh. Papua's most abiding problem over time has been the military occupation of the province and the violence that has accompanied it. At the upper levels of command, the Army has found the province a rich natural resource base for its official income-earning as well as a lucrative site for the illegal monies high-ranking officers are able to extort as "protection money" from businesses operating there. To maintain these income sources, however, it needs a rationale for retaining a large presence in Papua, and so it finds much convenience in labeling any deviation from complete allegiance to GOI as secessionism that must be rigorously suppressed. The need to exercise a degree of violence against the local population, in other words, fits very nicely into other military needs, and the Megawati government so far appears to be at least condoning such a posture against anything smacking of a separatist inclination.

Meanwhile, the troops themselves have their own rationale for violence against the civilian population, which stem from the reality of single young males being sent to duty in isolated places where there is little to do except consume alcohol and abuse the locals, abetted by officers not inclined to rein them in.

These unhappy realities have existed more or less since Papua was absorbed into Indonesia in the early 1960s. More recently they have been exacerbated by the militias being set up by the military all over the province, a practice reminiscent of the militias organized for East Timor and the destruction they brought about during that territory's last months as part of Indonesia. Finally and adding to all this have come indications that Laskar Jihad has entered the Papuan scene, spreading its own incentives to violence.

In sum, a number of threads conduce toward suppression of indigenous Papuan *adat* culture as well as toward violence against the civilian population. CSSP's provincial focus on conflict reduction, human rights and the *adat* community is well chosen.

Bringing governance to the citizenry in East Java. Implementing Law No. 22 Year 1999 on Local Government created a wholly new system of directly and indirectly elected local government units at the kabupaten level. Citizens now elect the legislative DPRD, which in turn elects the bupati and wakil bupati (governor and vice governor), who direct the kabupaten's executive body, the Pemda. A similar system functions at the village level with the directly elected BPD and the executive Pemdes. Law 22/99 also devolved significant power, responsibility and resources to the local level in a bold departure from the New Order's tightly centralized control of all local governance.

In theory, then, citizen control of local governance is in place. But in fact DPRD members generally have little or no experience in drafting legislation or monitoring government operations, so the exercise of this supervisory power has proven weak at best, while the Pemda houses all the bureaucratic machinery inherited from the New Order era. Clearly there is a major role for civil society to play here in providing citizen input to both the DPRD and the Pemda (and to both BDP and Pemdes), as well as in monitoring their performance. But while Law 22/99 could enact a new structure for a kabupaten-level legislature and executive, it could not create a new set of

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[8] The review team is indebted for much of the analysis here to Br. Theo van der Broeke of SKP, to Jonathan Simon of CSSP, and to the insightful monograph on adat culture published by CSSP (Simon et al., 2002).

civil society institutions where there had in effect been none earlier that could genuinely represent citizen concerns to government. The same applies to the village level as well. Civil society, in other words, has remained a blank page so far as GOI legislation goes, which after all is as it should be, for it is not the state's function in a democracy to create civil society and CSOs. That task must be taken up by the citizenry itself. In its absence, the Indonesian nemesis of KKN can be expected to continue flourishing and even dominating local governance.

The block grants that have come with Law 22/99 provide an excellent illustration of the basic problem here. Absent strong civil society institutions, marginally competent DPRDs decide on their own how to allocate the new funds, with the not surprising result that much of the money appears to flow into dubious ventures, patronage connections and even outright corruption.

With its immense population (already 34 million by the turn of the millennium, about 15% of the national total) and densely populated area, East Java reflects well both the challenges and opportunities offered by Law 22/99 and its implementation. The province's 29 kabupaten and 8 independent kota[9] provide an excellent setting in which to promote civil society as a counterbalance to the state and a means for organizing and promoting citizen participation in determining public policy.[10]

Local governance, natural resource exploitation and ethnic tension in East Kalimantan.
Like Sumatra and Papua, Kalimantan has long been known as an incredible storehouse of natural resource wealth – oil, minerals and timber. Beginning in the 1960s, those resources have been exploited in successive waves, first focusing on oil and gas, then for timber removal, and more recently mineral resources as well. Most of this process has consisted of simple extraction taking place under foreign concessions – a rich lode of KKN – but beginning in the 1980s, there has been some local value-added component through local industry, particularly plywood processing. While it has caused severe environmental damage, all this economic activity has generated a considerable number of jobs, as well as some royalty income to the provincial government of East Kalimantan.

But most of these benefits have gone to transmigrants from Java, Sulawesi and elsewhere, who now number about half the population. The indigenous inhabitants have largely been left behind, in terms of income, education, land rights and general living standards. Not surprisingly, there has been considerable resentment on the part of the adat population toward the newcomers. Even for the transmigrants, however, life has scarcely been easy, with exploitative labor conditions and few public services available. Widespread KKN was good for those linked in to the New Order's patronage networks, but provided little to the remaining population, whether indigenous or transmigrant. The new regional autonomy provided under the post-Suharto decentralization laws offers a hope for greater equity through citizen participation, however, and it makes sense that CSSP decided to focus on East Kalimantan, pursuing themes of local governance, labor and the adat community.

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[9] These kota or cities exist independently of the kabupaten in which they are geographically located and have similar governmental structures.
[10] East Java also offers opportunity to take on major social challenges, with its 7.5 million people below the poverty line – the highest number of any province in the country (see Debbie A. Lubis, "Government to launch drive to reduce poverty rate," *Jakarta Post*, 30 July 2002, p2)

CSSP's evolution

Evidently designed amid some haste,[11] CSSP was conceived to seize the opportunities offered by Indonesia's democratic transition to (1) build up strong, influential and self-sustaining groups of CSOs that could work on policy reform and democratic policy making and practices; and (2) enable these groups to address a range of key issues by raising them is a constructive way with government and the community to ensure that they are resolved in a democratic manner.

Program Elements

In order to achieve these objectives, the Mission identified four Performance Objectives (POs) namely: (1) PO1 – Analysis, Articulation and Effective Advocacy for Policy Reform; (2) PO2 – Effective Administrative Management and Planning; (3) PO3 – Strengthening NGO Capacity to Obtain Funding and Develop Sustainable Operations; and (4) PO4 – Grants to Indonesian NGOs Awarded and Managed Effectively. Benchmark indicators were identified for each of the four Program Objectives broken down further for each expected life of the project as Year 1, Year 2, etc. Additionally, a Special Activities Fund (SAF) amounting in a sense to a PO5 was included that allowed the program to support short-term, discrete and event-based activities arising from the implementation of the program and also allowed USAID/I to respond to opportunities related to Indonesia's democratic transition.

The review team sees these several POs and the SAF as strongly related, impacting each other in a cascading fashion as shown in Figure 1, with the final overall impact affecting the political system itself. The process begins with PO4 and the grant making process, which in most cases has involved considerable technical assistance (TA) to help potential grantees develop program strategies and acquire financial discipline. These efforts carry over to PO2 (capacity building) in that they build capacity in both these dimensions, and the financial discipline component starts grantees on the road to financial self-reliance, or PO3. The capacities enhanced under PO2 contribute to PO3 also, even as they primarily build a CSO's ability to take on the advocacy functions that form the heart of CSSP's overall objective. Meanwhile the SAF is contributing small-scale, discrete injections of support to all the POs. Finally, PO1 impacts the constituencies being represented by the CSOs, as well as the political system itself by improving levels of participation and accountabilty.

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[11] There is no record of a Project Activity Assistance Document or Design Activity Document that the review team could uncover. It appears that this project was conceived and approved because of the unfolding opportunity offered after the 1998 transition.

Figure 1. CSSP impact: a cascading process

Changing strategic objectives

When the contract was awarded to the consortium headed by Chemonics International, Inc. in October 1999, the program's performance objectives were lodged under the Democracy and Governance (DG) Special Objective (SO) #1, "Democratic Transition Strengthened" and its Intermediate Result (IR) #2, "Effective CSO participation in Political Processes". This then became Strategic Objective No. 5 with 3 IRs. These 3 IRs were focused on NGOs – their organizational development and advocacy, and the rule of law.

In September of 2000, amidst the rapidly changing political situation, the Mission came out with a new Country Strategy[12] anchored on two basic principles: " 1) the need to provide timely support for those leading or advocating reform in order to sustain and broaden Indonesia's political and economic transition; and 2) the need to strengthen the capacity of key institutions so that they can meet the priority needs and expectations of the Indonesian people". Seven Strategic Objectives (SOs) were identified, and the program was lodged in SO7, "Democratic reforms sustained and deepened", and the IR "NGOs advocate for democratic reform." In this new strategy, USAID/I decided to focus work in six geographical areas: East and West Java, West Papua, Aceh, North Sulawesi and East Kalimantan

The program's early days

The start up-year of program implementation saw some early problems owing to the basic design where a major role was given to the USAID's Civic Participation and Transition Team (CPT). In broad terms, this role was defined as: "providing the strategic framework, the funding levels

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and the policy regulating the contractor's activities," and manifested in Section 9 of the contract, "Right of USAID to supersede contractors decision"[13]. This CPT supervisory role differed significantly from CSSP's view of a creative program that would deepen the advocacy role of the NGOs through a nationwide grant program and training. In managerial terms, CPT wanted more intense hands-on role than CSSP preferred, while CSSP wanted more autonomy than CPT found desirable. Further complicating the relationship was what was perceived to be a still-delicate political situation in 1999 – a feeling that likely led to a greater sense of caution on the part of CPT than it might have otherwise exercised. [14]

Later changes in the management, both with CPT and CSSP, reduced the tension considerably. USAID now plays a less dominant role, and CSSP appears to be well on track with 44 grants extended and an additional 29 in the pipeline.

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[13] Agreement between Chemonics International, Inc. and the Agency for International Development, Contract No. 497-C-00-00053-00.

[14] The principals in charge of CPT had transferred to other posts by the time of our mid-term review, so the accuracy of this speculation cannot be ascertained.

II. CSSP Components

The contract lays out four POs as discrete components of CSSP, and at the time of our review the contractors had organized themselves along similar lines, with one senior staff member in charge of PO1 and PO3, a second dealing with PO2 and a third handling PO4. But the actual work being done does not fit so neatly into these categories, so that it often became difficult for the team to tell just under which PO a particular activity or its impact should best be assessed. If in processing a grant CSSP improves a CSO's ability to manage its finances, has PO4 or PO2 been furthered? Would improving ability to advocate a policy position best be counted under PO1 or PO2? Because of such dilemmas, we have surely misclassified some of our own analysis here, so if our readers find something missing in our discussion under one PO, we would ask them to look under the others.

Performance Objective 1. Analysis, articulation and effective advocacy for policy reform.

Although advocacy – which can be defined succinctly as the process by which individuals and organizations attempt to influence public policy – is not CSSP's only "end product," it is the primary one, as set forth in PO1. Other important themes center on transparency (the media-related initiatives) and enhancing local government capacity (the efforts observed in East Java and East Kalimantan).[15] But advocacy is clearly the principal purpose of most CSSP effort; it constitutes the immediate goal of PO1, as well as the ultimate goal of the other POs (cf. Figure 1). This centrality is highlighted in the Intermediate Result enunciated in the contract for CSSP, "NGOs advocate for democratic reform." (Contract p 11). Advocacy is not the only outcome goal of PO1, we should note. Enhancing transparency and strengthening local governance are also program objectives in fact, even if they are not stated as such in the contract.   Thus they are included in the PO1 circle in Figure 1. Because PO1 is the centerpiece of CSSP in terms of overall program impact, we devote more analysis to it in this report than to the other POs.

Objective statement. In the contract (p11), CSSP is called upon to "[p]rovide technical assistance (TA) to USAID/I to strengthen the capacity of Indonesian NGOs to:

(1)   analyze needs and policy issues;
(2)   articulate recommended reforms;
(3)   successfully advocate for needed reforms: and
(4)   monitor the effective implementation of those reforms."

Results indicators. The "results targets/deliverables" indicators outlined in the contract (p 12) are:

Year 1 – Selected Indonesian NGOs using reliable research to develop policy positions.
Year 2 – Selected Indonesian NGOs articulate polcy position through professional means (policy papers, etc.).
Year 3 – Selected Indonesian NGOs effectively advocate their issues with the government, Parliament, local leaders and the people.
Year 4 – New mechanisms for NGO participation in policy making established.

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[15] Accordingly these two outcome goals are included in the PO1 circle in Figure 1.

Year 5 – Reforms advocated by Indonesian NGOs adapted and implemented.[16]

Main findings. Certainly a number of CSOs have met the Year 3 target in effectively "advocating their issues" in various fora. At the national level, for example, SEAPA has had its draft freedom-of-information bill accepted by the DPR for this year's legislative docket, while YAPPIKA can claim at least some credit for MPR passage of the Foundation Law last year. At the local level, the Sidoarjo City Forum proposed an ordinance on street vendors that the DPRD accepted, and, while the review team was visiting Jayapura, AlDP fielded about 150 produce vendors in a demonstration requesting the city executive to provide transportation enabling them to bring that produce to market. CSSP appears well on target here.

If we look at the Semi-Annual Benchmarks specified in the contract (p 12), we find that "two policy papers on important issues" should be forthcoming during the first half of Year 3. Strictly speaking, the team did not find this to have occurred, but on the other hand, one grantee (SEAPA) has formulated draft legislation for the national legislature for a Freedom of Information act, and has drafted a Memorandum of Understanding on protecting journalists, which we would count as tantamount to meeting the requirement. As for the local level, now that CSSP's main thrust has transferred there, "policy papers" would seem rather a stretch to be expected of grantees. Instead, we would also point to the several draft legislative proposals submitted to kabupaten-level DPRDs.[17] In short, we would argue that what grantees have done meets the benchmarks set for the third year's halfway point.

Looking for impact. For the three principal kinds of activity undertaken within PO1 – advocacy, local governance and transparency – we need to trace evidence of what might be called "end impact" or "ultimate impact" in Figure 1, i.e., the outcome effects CSSP efforts are producing in terms of citizen participation and system accountability. In what follows, we will look at these three activities in order.

A different way to gauge advocacy impact

While the contract called for Indonesian NGOs to be "effectively advocating their issues" at this point, we would suggest a different approach to assessing achievement in advocacy, in the form of an "advocacy ladder" that measures impact on a graduated scale of steps. This ladder or hierarchy, currently in the final stages of articulation at DCHA/DG in Washington,[18] is shown in Figure 2. In brief, the central idea behind the ladder asserts that advocacy can be considered as a sequential chain, which begins with citizen *participation* or input into the political process. To the extent that this input succeeds, it compels the state to become *accountable* for its actions, to justify and modify its outputs in the form of policy change. Finally, if enough citizen input affects state policy, the quality of *contestation* will improve beyond periodic elections to continual citizen input, i.e., more *pluralism* in the polity.

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[16] The contract also notes (p 11) that a "committee composed of the Contractor, USAID/I and NGO representatives will assess measurement of progress of grantee NGOs on a semi-annual basis, but the committee was never formally constituted.

[17] The several sets of case studies issued under CSSP auspices might also be included here. For a list, see Mintz (2002, Annex A-2).

[18] See Blair (2002a) and Blair et al. (2002b) for more detail on the advocacy ladder.

Figure 2. Civil society advocacy ladder

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Constituency- & membership-based CSOs ↑      ↑
                                         Trustee-based CSOs

    ┌─────────────────────┐
    │    Contestation     │              Δ pluralism
    └─────────────────────┘                   ↑
              ↑                         Δ constituency benefits
    ┌─────────────────────┐                   ↑
    │  Accountability —   │              Δ empowerment
    │      outputs        │                   ↑
    └─────────────────────┘              Δ transparency
              ↑                               ↑
    ············································ Δ representation ·············
    ┌─────────────────────┐                   ↑
    │  Participation —    │              Δ voice
    │      inputs         │                   ↑
    │                     │              Δ mobilization
    └─────────────────────┘
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Δ indicates "an increase in"

The participation stage can be broken down into three sub-levels, as indicated in Figure 2. First comes mobilization, when a potential constituency (e.g., women, farmers, domestic abuse victims) becomes self-aware and begins to *mobilize* as a group. As the group develops and articulates an agenda, it gains a *voice* in public discourse, and if its voice succeeds in getting the state's attention (e.g., a petition is accepted, a public hearing is addressed, a mayor listens to a spokesperson), the group has attained some measure of *representation*.

The higher-level accountability stage also has three sub-levels, beginning with *transparency*, which occurs when the state finds itself having to reveal and justify or account for what is has done (or failed to do). Next comes *empowerment*, when the state accepts at least some part of a group's issue agenda (e.g., a regulation is issued, a bill is passed, a public promise to act is made). When the state in fact follows through and carries out its stated intention, then the group has attained *constituency benefits*. When a good number of important groups have attained this stage, the overall level of *pluralism* is enhanced.

Two caveats are in order at this point. First, it should be pointed out that this third stage has generally not been included as a USAID democracy objective. Rather the goals have tended to amount to one or another of the participation or accountability sub-levels. For instance, CSSP's goal in terms of the contract – "to successfully advocate for needed reforms" – would be closest to the empowerment tier in Figure 2's hierarchy. But if the Agency is to fully support democratic consolidation as an objective, it makes sense to set enhanced systemic pluralism as an ultimate objective. A relevant subtext here is to note that CSSP cannot be held accountable for meeting a goal that even the Agency has not accepted except perhaps by implication. Even so, increased pluralism makes a worthy final objective for democratization support.

Secondly, we should note that while some CSOs do have actual memberships, a good many of them, particularly public interest CSOs in such fields as human rights, are what some have labeled "trustee" organizations, acting (or claiming to act) on behalf of a reference group that cannot mobilize and act on its own (or at least has not done so thus far).[19] Typically, victims of human rights abuses are often such a group; initiatives for legal reform are another type of trustee effort. These CSOs in effect begin with the representation rung of the ladder. A third type, which can be placed between the trustee and membership groups, consists of what might best be called self-aware constituency groups. Here the CSO does connect with a constituency, which could be one already self-consciously aware that it exists and anxious for change (e.g., the produce vendors in Jayapura looking for transportation to the city that we will find AlDP assisting in the next section) or could be potentially conscientized and mobilized for civil society efforts (e.g., the adat communities in Papua hoping for relief from military depredations but not aware of what participatory political avenues might be available).

In sum, we have a rank ordering of CSOs, ranging from organizations that operate as *membership organizations* through groups that work with *self-conscious (though unorganized) constituencies* to bodies that claim (generally but not always with legitimacy) to *represent weak and vulnerable categories* of people who cannot act on their own. The first type comprises CSOs with an organized base (labor unions and chambers of commerce would be examples), while the second consists of CSOs working with self-conscious and energized but as yet unorganized groups of people (e.g., neighborhood citizens upset about local water supply or interested in better schools), and the third includes CSOs exercising a representative role on behalf of a category of citizens (for instance people living next to a toxic lake or victims of police extortion). Part of the challenge in assisting civil society – particularly in moving toward sustainability – is helping CSOs move from the third type to the second and first types.

Civil society and sectoral activities

Table 2 shows an illustrative sample of the CSOs visited by the review team in terms of the advocacy ladder, grouped by sectoral activity across the three provinces surveyed as well as some of the several national CSOs we were able to call on. We sum up the main impacts of each of Table 2's CSOs briefly here.

Foker[20] works out of Jayapura, providing its own TA and training to local NGOs, as well as making subgrants to local NGOs. Of the CSOs visited in Papua, Foker was clearly the most impressive. Its main initiative recently has been a Peace Campaign to promote reduced violence between the outsiders (most prominently the military but also the police) and the indigenous adat community. The Foker group active in Merauke (a good example of a trustee CSO acting on behalf of female recipients of military abuse unable to take action themselves) proved able through establishing a dialogue between local leaders and military officers to effect a *modus vivendi* between the Army units posted there and the citizens, such that incidents of rape and other violence against civilians dropped dramatically. Thus actual constituency benefits were achieved.

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[19] For an insightful analysis of the "trustee" NGO in contrast to those based on constituencies, see Ottaway (2000).
[20] See Annex A for a list of the acronyms used in this report; we have followed local custom in using the acronyms rather than the full names.

Table 2. Sectoral CSOs and the advocacy ladder
(programs in *italics* not CSSP-supported)

Activity type		Human rights				Labor	Environment	Religious	HIV/AIDS	Journalists	Macro-reform
CSO name		Foker	AlDP	LPPMA	LBHP	LEKSIP	YBML	Lakpesdam NU	*FHI & Yas-anto*	SEAPA	YAPPIKA
CSO type		T	T→C	T→M	T	M	T	M	*T*	M	T
Place		Jayapura & Merauke	Jayapura & Merauke	Jayapura	Jayapura	Samarinda	Balikpapan	Lamongan	*Jayapura & Merauke*	Jakarta	Jakarta
Province		E Java	E Java	Papua	Papua	E Kalim.	E Kalim.	E Java	*Papua*	National	National
Cont	Pluralism										
Accountability	Constituency benefits	Decreased military abuses, in short term									
	Empowerment									FOI draft accepted by DPR	Influenced MPR passage of foundation law
	Transparency				Proposed Peace/Justice Commission			Lamongan DPRD trip exposed			
Participation	Representation		Produce vendors' demonstration	Anticipated training impact	Victims of 1975 army attack	Draft law rebuffed by DPRD	Provided draft law to DPRD	Dialogue with local govts	*100% condom use resolution*	Journalists as constituency	
	Voice			Goal of the training							
	Mobilization		Community activist training					NGO network	*Beginning to involve families*		
Pre-participation			Mapping conflict								

CSO type: M = membership-based; C = constituency-based; T = trustee.

Like most human rights CSOs in Papua, **AlDP** had been working as a trustee organization to represent the interests of the adat community, but more recently it has branched out to take up more constituency-oriented efforts. At the time of the review team's visit, AlDP's Jayapura office organized a demonstration of produce vendors to petition the bupati to provide transport to bring their produce to the city market, or in other words mobilized a constituency, helped it set a policy agenda, gain a voice, and even attain some representation when the demonstrators presented their petition to the bupati. Whether the bupati and local Pemda will agree to their request (i.e., become in some sense accountable to them) remains to be seen.[21]

LPPMA is an older organization, dating from 1988, focusing initially on legal aid to the adat community and later changing its basic mission to an outreach effort to mobilize indigenous communities to become aware of and stand up for their legal rights. So far, they have been using their CSSP grant to organize training for 6 local tribal councils in the Jayapura area, whom they hope to capacitate to implement the participatory rungs of the advocacy ladder. In doing so, LPPMA is trying to reach beyond energizing a constituency to build a membership-based organization.

LBHP is a legal aid CSO, focusing on adat community issues. While not a direct grantee, this older group (founded in 1986) has received support to attend CSSP workshops, which it found most helpful in strengthening its abilities to research the cases it has represented. In addition to representing individuals (e.g., many land cases against the government), it has also initiated a larger action on behalf of victims of a particularly vicious military rampage in 1975. And at the accountability level on the advocacy ladder, it has proposed a Peace and Justice Commission for the province which as attracted some attention. If the commission comes into existence, it would contribute to transparency on the ladder.

LEKSIP is a labor CSO, engaged mainly in representing worker interests to management at a number of local industries. In the strictest sense, such activity does not fall within the civil society rubric (i.e., the CSO is not dealing with the state or its organs on behalf of its constituency), but in a wider interpretation it does (labor after all forms a major focus for USAID/Washington's civil society efforts). So far it has gained acceptance for two collective bargaining agreements with Kalimantan firms. Within the more orthodox meaning of civil society, LEKSIP initiated a draft labor bill with the provincial legislature. In the event, the draft was rejected, but the initiative indicates that this CSO is pursuing representational avenues in terms of the advocacy ladder.

YBML is another CSO in East Kalimantan, focusing on environmental issues. Although a trustee organization in our terms, it has made strenuous efforts at public consultations (held in five sub-districts) to formulate a draft environmental regulation for managing a forest reserve near Balikpapan. The city council has accepted the idea (we think, though are not completely sure), and a management board should begin work shortly.

Lakpesdam NU constitutes the East Java chapter of the national Nadhlatul Ulama (NU), the country's largest Muslim NGO, headed by former President Gus Dur. It is thus very much a mass-based organization. It has used CSSP support to build capacity within three of its local units to energize its members regarding citizen concerns and engage with local government. Beginning with these participation activities, it has moved into the accountability portion of the ad-

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[21] Chances appeared good that it would, because one elected member of the DPRD lived near the vendors and supported the petition by joining the demonstration.

vocacy ladder as well, with its Lamongan unit recently having publicized what it found to be a wasteful expenditure of government monies to send DPRD members on a junket to Kalimantan.

FHI & Yasanto are not CSSP grantees, but are instead supported by USAID/Jakarta's HPN sectoral team. They offer a good illustration of USAID-assisted civil society endeavors outside of the CSSP ambit, however, and so we include them as part of our "360°" coverage. FHI is an HPN grantee, operating in Papua and making subgrants to several more local NGOs, including Yasanto in Merauke. Yasanto's principal focus with their subgrant has been on HIV/AIDS, which has a high prevalence in Papua and an extraordinarily high incidence in Merauke – the highest in the entire country, evidently fueled by widespread poverty inducing women to turn to prostitution, combined with high-risk sexual behavior. Yasanto has been working as a trustee organization, providing direct assistance to AIDS patients and – more importantly from our civil society vantage point – pressing the city council to pass new regulations designed to reduce HIV exposure. Its principal current effort aims to require 100% condom use by all prostitutes in Merauke city, and it is pushing the DPRD to pass a resolution to this effect. It has also begun to reach out to families of AIDS patients, a difficult endeavor when so far the major social response has been for families to outcast members with advanced AIDS symptoms. In our terms, the involvement of families opens the possibility that this trustee organization could take on a constituency base that would enhance prospects for sustainability.[22]

Even after the shift from national to provincial level in 2000, CSSP continued to support a number of CSOs working at the larger level. The team was able to visit several of them, including the two briefly described here.

SEAPA is an ASEAN regional international organization, and so in addition to its CSSP support receives a good deal of inspiration and technical support from its sister chapters, as well as from other donors aside from CSSP. Accordingly, it is difficult to sort out the impact of CSSP assistance from these other factors. Even so, it would appear that the CSSP assistance, especially the training in management and financial sustainability, has helped make SEAPA a more effective organization and one better able to spend its grant moneys on its core program of advocacy for press freedom and protection of journalists. Both have come under some threat with increasing secretiveness and governmental harassment of the press under the Megawati administration. Recently SEAPA succeeded in getting the national legislature (DPR) to accept a draft freedom of information act onto its docket for action in the current session, and it is working on Memoranda of Understanding to establish standards for relations between the press and police and between the press and political parties. In addition it has worked to cultivate the journalistic community as a constituency, thus moving beyond the trustee to the member-based mode of organization.

Another national organization, **YAPPIKA** has worked on general civil society issues, in particular the national Foundation Law No. 16, passed in 2000 and due to become effective in August 2002. In lobbying to pass the law, YAPPIKA formed a coalition of like-minded groups with its CSSP support. The law should help civil society in a number of dimensions, e.g., gaining official status for a CSP, regularizing auditing requirements. But there remain a number of areas to work on, such as tax codes applying to non-profit CSOs.

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[22] As has happened in a number of E&E countries, where an imploded health delivery system proved unable to respond to rising AIDS incidence. Family members of patients then organized to demand assistance and rights for victims.

Civil society and local governance

The CSOs we have looked at so far here are essentially sectoral organizations, working in areas such as human rights, environment, health, etc., whether at national or (more commonly, given the regional focus pursued after 2000) at the local level. There are also a group of organizations whose activities center on local governance issues, rather than any particular sector. A number of these are illustrated in Table 3.

Table 3. Local governance CSOs and the advocacy ladder
(programs in *italics* not CSSP-supported)

Activity type		Urban issues				City governance	Village governance	
CSO name		City Forum	City Forum	City Forum	*DLG Perform*	YPSDI	LPKP	LBBPJ
CSO type		T	T	T	*T*	T→ C	T	M
Place		Mojokerto	Pamekasan	Sidoarjo	*Malang*	Malang	Malang	Samarinda
Province		E Java	E Java	E Java	*E Java*	E Java	Papua	E Kalim.
Cont	Pluralism							
Accountability	Constituency benefits							
	Empowerment			Street vendor resolution passed by DPRD				
	Transparency		Public services complaint center		*Kota explains itself on issues*	City parliament watch		
Participation	Representation	Govt promises on gambling		Factory toxic waste publicized			Strengthen village NGOs & BPDs to work with each other	
	Voice							Using local radio & TV
	Mobilization			Women's crisis center?		Raising citizen awareness		MobilizingAdat community

CSO type: M = membership-based; C = constituency-based; T = trustee.

The City Forums came into CSSP as a legacy managed by CARE from the earlier CLEAN Urban project, which ended in March 2001.[23] Under CSSP, CARE as a member of the consortium manages the City Forums in what appeared to be a loose coordination with CSSP's other activities in East Java. The review team was able to visit three City Forums out of the 19 currently being supported.[24]

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[23] CLEAN Urban was assessed in Evans et al. (2001).
[24] Of the 19 City Forums, 13 are in East Java and the remainder in adjoining Central Java province.

The City Forums were initiated in response to the two pathbreaking laws on decentralization passed in 1999, which in effect transferred an immense number of functions from what had been the tightly centralized Suharto government to the local level.[25] In the process, elected local legislatures (DPRD) were set up at provincial, district (kabupaten) and city (levels), along with an executive branch (Pemda) headed by an officer elected by the DPRD. At the village level, an analogous elected council (BPD) was established, which would then indirectly elect the head of the village executive branch (Pemdes). In sum, a new set of structures were put into place with the only formal citizen involvement being the elections for the DPRDs and BPDs. The representatives elected to these bodies had virtually no experience in drafting legislation or in overseeing the executives who in theory were accountable to them.

The basic City Forum concept was to erect an additional body to provide citizen input to the new local structure by establishing City Forums and then building their capacity to develop public issues and in the process increase their public legitimacy as credible citizen groups participating in local governance. The City Forums do not have a formal structure, but rather are open to any citizen concerned with a particular issue, so they have in effect a rolling membership of stakeholders – local leaders, legislature members, private sector businessmen, local government officials – self-selected ad hoc as each new public issue becomes defined, deliberated on and a consensus built for advocacy around it.   CARE's role has been to build City Forum capacity through training and technical assistance. In its own thinking, CARE sees the City Forums as a third structure in local governance, providing citizen-based inputs to the DPRD and Pemda.[26]

The approach is what might be called a classic trustee basis for organization, wherein local leaders act on behalf of the citizenry to formulate positions on public policy issues, and then lobby the DPRD and Pemda to accept their formulations. Given the inexperience of local governments in managing public affairs after the passage of the new decentralization laws in 1999 and the virtual vacuum of local CSOs just after the democratic transition of 1998, it can be argued that this approach based on recruiting local elites into public policy discourse was the appropriate step to take. Certainly it was a much faster way to inject citizen concerns into the policy process than building membership-based CSOs would have been.

Each of the three City Forums visited had taken on a number of policy issues, of which several are presented in Table 3. In **Mojokerto**, there was much public concern about gambling, which had become a major criminal industry. The City Forum had formed an ad hoc group to lobby the city to crack down on it, had met with city officials and received promises that it would be looked into. In terms of our advocacy ladder, this would amount to representation. If the city proceeds to investigate, some transparency would hopefully result as practices came under more public scrutiny, and perhaps empowerment as well, if city ordinances were enacted to reduce gambling.

In **Pamekasan**, the City Forum has been quite active, recently signing a contract with the kabupaten Pemda to provide training to all the village councils (BPDs) in the district. As for public

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[25] For an analysis of how these laws have played out in practice, see TAF (2002); also Antlöv (2000) and *Van Zorge Report* (2002).
[26] CARE has developed an elaborate framework at both theoretical and applied levels to promote the City Forum concept, now available in several Bahasa publications as well as a sophisticated PowerPoint presentation.

policy issues, the City Forum convinced the local executive to set up a public services complaint center. If it works as intended, the center would become a focus for transparency in the area.

The City Forum in **Sidoarjo** has involved itself in a number of areas, including serious environmental problems with a leather factory discharging toxic wastes into the adjacent water supply, a matter which it has publicized sufficiently to bring about public meetings including factory representatives and the city government. On another issue, the City Forum lobbied the DPRD successfully to pass a regulation setting up a designated place for street vendors to operate, where they would be less subject to the intimidation and extortion traditionally exercised by local police. Finally, the Sidoarjo City Forum had opened a women's crisis center, primarily intended to assist with domestic abuse problems. In time, the center might move to conscientizing its clients and thus begin to take on aspects of a membership-based enterprise, though at the time of the review team's visit it was just getting itself organized as a trustee operation.

Another legacy of CLEAN Urban was the **Perform** program contracted to the Research Triangle Institute and then absorbed into the USAID Mission's SO10 on Democratic Local Governance. Perform is similar to the City Forum program in a number of ways, focusing on the city (kota) level and building elite citizen input to the local political process, but it concentrates more on participation in urban planning, while the CARE initiative centers its efforts more on policy advocacy.[27] In at least some cases, the Perform groups appeared to have effected a degree of transparency by getting the city government to explain itself on budgetary issues, but it was hard to discern what else Perform was doing, despite two interviews with the program in Malang.[28]

YPSDI, another grantee in East Java, concentrates on city-level politics, specifically on the elected legislatures in three cities including Malang, where the team visited this CSO. YPSDI's principal activity has been its Parliament Watch, which monitors three city-level DPRDs with the intent of making them more open and responsive to public concerns, particularly on policymaking and budgeting. At the same time, YPSDI has launched an outreach effort to contact citizen groups to become more involved in public policy issues. Already the organization has had some impact, in that the Malang DPRD has launched a lawsuit against YPSDI claiming that its public image has been besmirched.

Two other initiatives centering on local governance are also illustrated in Table 2. **LPKP** in Malang is unique within CSSP[29] in that it deals with both sides of the local governance equation – the democratic side included in the advocacy ladder (local NGOs) and the local government side (BPDs). This organization works with BPDs in some 40 villages as well as 20 assorted village-level NGOs representing farmers, women, and other local interests. A well-established organization (it has received funding from a Belgian donor since 1993 and since then has obtained a number of other grants), LPKP constitutes a relatively mature enterprise, working in effect as an

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[27] In general, the two programs appeared to be more similar than different, and the review team found it difficult to distinguish between them. There appears to be some coordination between the two initiatives at the USAID Mission (i.e., between the SO7 and SO10 teams), but it was hard to tell how this worked. Where both programs worked in the same province (East Java, though the same is likely true in Central Java as well), there appeared to be very little connection if any between the two activities.

[28] It would have been good to follow up these brief interviews with visits to other Perform field operations as well as the contractor and more extensive discussions with the SO10 team members, but the time we could devote to this added "360º" task was unfortunately limited.

[29] So far as we could tell. There may be other CSSP efforts that are similar but which we did not get to visit.

intermediate service organization providing TA to other CSOs. In terms of the advocacy ladder, we could say that LPKP is working at the representation level.

The last group shown in Table 3, **LBBPJ**, has been working on lines somewhat parallel to the City Forum program in endeavoring to enhance citizen input as a third element into the decentralized political structure of legislature and executive set up in the 1999 laws. But whereas the City Forums operate at city and district level, LBBPJ works with villages, trying to energize and capacitate local tribal (adat) institutions to deal with the village BPD and Pemda. A second difference is that LBBPJ is directing its efforts at the adat community as a whole rather than at local leaders. To date, the initiative appears to have progressed beyond the mobilization stage into voice, with radio and even some TV coverage articulating the adat effort to be heard. Like LPKP, LBBPJ is also an older organization, begun in 1992 and a recipient of funding from Dutch and Japanese donors.

Using the advocacy ladder

A glance at Tables 2 and 3 reveals several things. First, fully 13 of the 16 CSOs supported are trustee-based, not mass or membership groups, while only three are membership-oriented and none are constituency-based. Given the embryonic state of civil society at the end of the New Order era, this is scarcely surprising. There were (and still are) relatively few constituency-based CSOs up and running, so it made very good sense to work with trustee organizations, or where there were no organizations to speak of already in place, to begin by building trustee entities (such as the City Forum groups). As time goes on, the trustee groups should be encouraged to develop constituency bases, as AlDP and LPPMA are doing, for without a membership or at least a self-conscious constituency, their chances to attaining sustainability over time are probably slim.

Second, of all the 17 groups included in Tables 2 and 3, none have contributed to a more pluralistic political system, and only one appears to have provided distinct constituency benefits so far (Foker), while three have shown some attainment at the empowerment rung of the ladder (SEAPA, YAPPIKA, and the Sidoarjo City Forum). And even these achievements need some discounting. Foker was able to bring about an understanding with military authorities that sharply decreased violence against the civilian population, but within a few months of this breakthrough the military unit was transferred elsewhere, and a new unit moved in to take their place. The underlying problems of idle, isolated and undisciplined troops combined with available alcohol quickly re-emerged, and so too did violence against civilians. For Foker, it was back to square one, though hopefully the earlier experience would make a second military détente easier to achieve.

SEAPA does appear to have been the key group in getting the Freedom of Information draft accepted on the national legislature docket for action during the current session, but it should also be noted that at slot 21 on the calendar, it will get considered after item 16 in the queue, which is a proposal to increase governmental secrecy strongly backed by the military. If the latter passes, SEAPA's bill may well become impossible to pass.

YAPPIKA asserts it was an important player in influence the passage of the Foundation Law, but there are surely other claimants here (as with any important law passed in a national legislature), and while YAPPIKA was surely important, a true accounting would almost certainly show others getting a share of the glory. From what the review team could ascertain about the Sidoarjo City

Forum, it does deserve major credit for the street vendors resolution passed by the DPRD, but it appeared to us that the real motive here was not so much to obtain a suitable venue in which the vendors could thrive as to relegate disruptive street hawkers to someplace where they would bother fewer people. Similarly, there may be less than immediately meets the eye with other attainments on the advocacy ladder. LEKSIP's draft labor law was after all rebuffed by the DPRD, promises about gambling given to the Mojokerto City Forum are at this stage only promises, and so on.

Even after the discounting, however, the ladder still makes it possible to pinpoint some real achievements. Given the long historical backdrop of an unresponsive and unaccountable state at all levels and the smothering effect the New Order had on civil society, it does count for something when a CSO gains a grip on one of the advocacy ladder's rungs. The ladder, then, facilitates assessing CSP impact attainment, making it possible to zero in on where successes occur.

The advocacy ladder should also be understood as a device to gauge ambition and suggest new initiatives, not just assess attainment. Its central importance for CSSP lies in its ability to indicate how far a CSO has advanced, where it now wants to go, and where it might be advised to proceed in the future. For instance, LEKSIP should be encouraged to try again with different tactics on its labor law proposal, and if it succeeds in gaining passage, to advance to promoting transparency in working conditions. The Pamekasan City Forum should be encouraged to think how the public services complaint center might lead to efforts to reform city administration, thus shifting from transparency to empowerment on the ladder. If the Mojokerto city executive fails to deliver on its gambling promises, the City Forum there could launch queries to find out why not, moving from representation to attempted transparency on the ladder. Foker should consider developing a constituency that could serve as a permanent advocate for citizen interests, so that a continuing presence would be available in Merauke to deal with the military each time a new unit gets posted there. Similar prescriptions could be made for most of the CSOs included in these two tables.

In one last comment on the ladder, we should note that it should not be taken as a universal prescriptive tool to exhort "upward" movement through the rungs, nor is the ranking concept of trustee/constituency/membership to be considered a directive instruction to all CSOs. Indeed, in some cases, to go "up" one ranking would mean to go "down" the other. For instance, the Sidoarjo City Forum would perhaps be best advised to mobilize citizens affected by the toxic factory effluent to bring more pressure on the city authorities, which would mean expanding from a trustee to a constituency-based approach. But while this would mean shifting up one ranking in the three-level CSO typology, it would mean moving down the advocacy ladder, from representation to mobilization and voice. What a particular CSO should be advised to do, then, is very contingent upon the situation within which it is working. The value of the ladder and CSO typology is to offer a *framework* for making diagnoses and providing advice.

The media

Strictly speaking, CSSP's media support efforts don't exactly fit under PO1 in the same sense as the sectoral CSOs and the local governance initiatives, for the media do not consist of CSOs. Nor is there a specific media component elsewhere in CSSP. But the media certainly do fit into PO1's second sub-objective (to "analyze needs and policy issues") and to some extent into its third one (to "articulate recommended reforms"), as well as the fourth (to "monitor the effective

implementation of these reforms"), so it makes sense to evaluate media program impact under the PO1 heading.

Headquartered in Surabaya, **LKM/Media Watch** was the most exciting of the CSSP media grantees that we visited. Founded by Sirikit Syah, an dynamic and crusading journalist, LKM has assumed a leading role in promoting press freedom, journalistic standards and ethics as well as media involvement in public affairs. Its lead activity, supported earlier by an OTI grant and now with CSSP funding, has been its monthly Media Watch Newsletter, which provides a self-scrutiny of the media as well as monitoring press freedom issues. It has also pioneered radio journalism, most notably with a weekly radio talk show on Surabaya's most popular radio station. Recently the show has focused on police violence against reporters, domestic abuse, and the government's removal of a TV station license. The "watch" approach is also embodied in another CSSP grantee program supporting **ISAI**, which produces a monthly Media Watch magazine focusing on the media itself, particularly on media law.

Though discussed above as a CSO advocate for journalists as a constituency, **SEAPA** should also be considered as a media organization, documenting and publicizing official harassment of the press. Like LKM and ISAI, it also publishes a monthly journal called Alert.

One last media organization visited was *Jubi*, a weekly adat community newspaper published in Jayapura. *Jubi* has been supported not by CSSP but under a direct grant from the CPT team and so serves as one of our ancillary "360°" examples. Begun as an underground operation during the Suharto period, *Jubi* now seeks to be the "voice of the voiceless" for the adat community, which the regular press largely ignores. Allied with the Foker CSO, the paper has received CPT support for several activities, among them investigative journalism (which is very resource-intensive for small publications). It has done in-depth reporting on topics like illegal logging and construction corruption, and has now positioned itself as the "Special Autonomy Watchdog" to monitor and report on the new legal measures that went into effect for Papua province in early 2002, designed to meet at least some of the popular adat demands for less central control.[30]

Performance Objective 2. Effective administrative management and planning

Objective Statement. "Improve the ability of Indonesian NGOs to plan and manage their activities and resources." (Contract, p. 12).

Results Indicators. The "results targets/deliverables" indicators outlined in the contract (p 12) are:

> Year 1 – Selected Indonesian NGOS have suitable financial management systems in place
> Years 2 & 3 – Strategic Plans in Place, including performance targets and measurement
> Year 4 – Appropriate policies regarding personnel, travel, training, and property management in place
> Year 5 – Routine and surprise audits have no major findings.

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[30] The *Jubi* staff consider their reporting on the framing of the Special Autonomy Act as their best journalistic initiative, during which they were able to publish drafts of the act and to advocate for its passage.

Among the many components included under this PO, which is often referred to more generically as "capacity building" are financial management, internal auditing, accessing technical services, strategic planning, target setting, defining indicators of progress, collecting data, monitoring, evaluating, close-out, personnel management and policies, and property management. The impact of PO2 comes both internally in the form of stronger CSOs and externally in the form of CSOs more capable of raising resources on their own (PO3) and better able to take on the advocacy work of PO1 that is the core purpose of CSSP, as shown in Figure 1.

Main findings. Through the grant development and management processes, CSSP has enhanced the capacities of Indonesian NGO grantees in financial management and in developing strategic plans including performance targets and indicators. More specifically, during its first year of operations, CSSP established a three-phase procedure for determining financial worthiness of the NGO grantees, which included prior assessment, software adoption, and monitoring. This system has been followed down to the present. While it is formally a part of PO4, it is also very much a tool for strengthening CSO financial management systems (i.e., the first-year objective for PO2), so it is considered here.

In the prior assessment phase, CSSP's financial management staff looks for and endeavors to correct weaknesses in an applicant CSO's internal system pertaining to management capabilities, financial management, accounting system, internal control, property and procurement system and budget analysis. The range of action for these categories may include disclosure of financial reports to members, developing guidelines for salaries, benefits and per diem, opening a bank account for the grant and segregation of funds, requiring multiple quotes for procurement, a monthly work plan and budget, etc.

The second phase includes installation and adoption of financial management system software as part of the requirement for receiving a CSSP grant. All grantees are required to use the accounting software Quick-Books Pro.Ink[31]. Training on the use of software is provided by CSSP. In the third or monitoring phase (which begins after a grant has been received), the grantee submits monthly financial reports (needed to obtain the next month's cash advance), and CSSP financial management unit visits grantees on a regular basis to determine compliance with established procedures.[32]

But the PO2 aim of improving "effective administrative management and planning" comprises much more than financial management per se. It also entails developing strategic plans and work plans, personnel management systems, non-financial monitoring schemes, and policy analysis skills among other things. Through a combination of CSSP's ongoing one-on-one technical assistance to the grantees with group training, either by CSSP itself or NGO service providers such as SATUNAMA and INSIST, partner NGOs have been enabled to develop these capacities.[33] And CSSP grantees have also provided group training, as with Foker and SKP offering workshops in human rights advocacy.

Two of the tools used by CSSP should be mentioned here in particular. The first is the self-assessment instrument introduced to the CSOs called Participatory Advocacy Self-Assessment

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[31] The Quickbooks program is an applied software accounting package easily found in local markets.
[32] Several grantees found particular expense items were "disallowed" after their reports were analyzed by CSSP, and there was one case in which CSSP terminated a grant because of irregularities.
[33] For more specific information on measurement issues (included as part of the results indicator target for Years 2 and 3), see our discussion under PO4.

(PACSA), which provides them an opportunity to assess their advocacy capacity involving constituents and stakeholders and refine the advocacy plan if necessary.[34] The second tool is the old USAID "logical framework" approach, which was mentioned by a number of NGOs interviewed as the "most useful instrument" in the development of their individual strategic plans, including performance targets and measurements. In particular, they said that the log-frame approach provided visualization of the relevance of identified activities, time frame, action, actors and budget vis-à-vis the project objectives.[35]

It seems reasonable to conclude, especially in view of the very rudimentary planning and management skills possessed by most grantees at the time of their grant applications, that it has been the CSSP training that has in significant measure enabled grantees to exercise the management capability and to formulate the plans they appeared to have in place at the time of the review team's work.[36] All this took much effort from CSSP, resulting in meeting the results targets for Years 2/3. The effort included some 35 workshops, training sessions, etc., involving almost 800 participants down through the first half of calendar 2002, plus much one-on-one consultation not included in such data.[37] Attribution is often a difficult claim to make in the foreign aid sphere, particularly in democracy work, where so many multiple causes are at play, and especially with training, which is traditionally difficult to trace through to outcomes, but it would seem to be in order here. Credit can be claimed.[38]

Performance Objective 3: Strengthening NGO Capacity to obtain Funding and Develop Sustainable Operations

Objective Statement. "Designated Indonesian NGOs will be able to apply for and secure grant funding for the pursuit of their democracy- promotion activities from international donors and local sources. In addition Indonesian NGOs will plan to and raise funds through individual and institutional donations and other income generating activities." (Contract, p. 12).

Result Indicators. The "results targets/deliverables" indicators outlined in the contract (p 12) are:

> Year 1 – Selected Indonesian NGOs acquainted with procedure for application to USAID for funding.
> Year 2 - Indonesian Applications to Contractor are approved.
> Year 3 - Selected Indonesian NGO secure funding from other donors.
> Year 4 – Fund-raising plans in place.

Main findings. In general, CSSP has not only met the requirements of this Program Objective including the results indicators and the attendant benchmarks but in some cases has gone beyond the required task. In making this conclusion, however, we would also observe that the hurdles

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[34] Among other techniques the PACSA instrument includes training in SWOT analysis, which stands for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats

[35] CSSP (and evidently quite a few grantees) have found the log-frame approach valuable, even though this standard USAID procedure of the 1980s has long been out of fashion within the Agency itself.

[36] We should note that several grantees, in all cases more experienced organizations, complained that they already knew everything brought up by CSSP staff or presented in training sessions, that the capacity building enterprise was too simple for them, etc. But the vast majority of grantees did appear to find it very useful.

[37] The quantitative data on training is from Mintz (2002, Attachment B).

[38] That credit belongs to PO4 as well as PO2, we should stress.

for this PO appear to have been quite modest, perhaps reflecting a feeling that a civil society so soon out of the starting blocks after Indonesia's democratic transition would have a very hard time attaining any degree of self-sustainability. Happily any such somber prognosis has been disproved, as CSSP-assisted CSOs have made some headway toward this end. Even so, the road ahead to a genuine sustainable civil society sector remains a very long one indeed, and one that few if any CSOs will traverse completely in the near-term future.

Certainly the results expected for years one and two have been achieved, in significant part no doubt because they constituted a central component of PO4 as well as PO2. That is, as part of the grant-making process, would-be grantees had to get their proposals up to an acceptable standard, for which they received considerable technical assistance and guidance from CSSP's PO4 component. We have mentioned elsewhere, but it is worth pointing out again here that much of the arduous work required on the part of applicants did pay dividends, not only in terms of the grant money itself but also by way of making the grantee organizations more capable of proposing, designing, implementing, monitoring, accounting for and reporting on their programs – all qualities that are essential to becoming self-sustaining operations. Most of the grantees – particularly the newer ones emerging after the democratic transition – entered the civil society arena thinking that good ideas and energetic leadership constituted both necessary and sufficient requirements to succeed as organizations, but in the course of obtaining their grants they began to understand that a good deal more was called for. Beyond this, the PO2 training materially improved grantee prospects for undertaking the strategic planning and making the proposals required to obtain funding from other donors.

During the first half of 2002, CSSP began conducting a survey of its grantees, in order to get an idea of their ability to raise funds from other donors. Results are shown in Table 4. Of the 17 CSOs included so far (out of the 44 which had received grants), 11 were "older" organizations, dating from before the 1998 democratic transition, while 6 were "new" (i.e., post-Suharto) CSOs. As of the time of the survey, 5 of the 11 old CSOs and 4 of the 6 new ones had received funding from other donors.

It is significant that new as well as old organizations have been able to raise resources, for it could be argued that at least some of the older ones might have developed abilities to do so on their own (though several of them have said that the CSSP training and TA helped them materially in this regard). For example LP3ES, one of the most well-established NGOs in Indonesia, had been obtaining support from other donors before the democratic transition of 1998 and will most likely continue doing so long after CSSP finishes its work. But the newer ones, which generally lacked NGO competence in all dimensions, surely would have found it much more difficult to build such skills on their own. The fact that a number of them have managed to raise funds from other donors with CSSP help provides strong evidence that the assistance was critical to their success. In any case, the performance shown in Table 4 would appear to more than fulfill the results indicator requirements for CSSP's third year.

Table 4. CSSP-assisted CSOs and resource generation (results of a CSSP survey)

	CSO	Organization	Applied for grant	Grant received	Services supplied
Older CSOs – founded before 1998 (n = 11)	ISAI	Ford Foundation	X	X	
		UNDP	X	X	
	Lakpesdam NU	No applications			
	LBH	Proposal under preparation			
	LKIS	TAF	X	X	
		IFES	X	X	
	LP3ES	Ford Foundation	X	X	
		Sasakawa Peace Foundation	X	X	
		IFES	X	X	
		World Bank	X	X	
		AusAID	X	X	
		DfID	X	X	
		GOI – Dept of Internal Affairs			X
		GOI – Dept of Agriculture			X
		Local governments			X
		PAN (political party)			X
		Adidas Corporation			X
	Muklis (Yamajo)	Proposal under preparation			
	SPEKTRA	No applications			
	WALHI	PACT	X	X	
		DfID	X	X	
		UNDP	X		
	Yayasan Obor	No applications			
	YLKI	Ford Foundation	X	X	
		ESCAP/UN	X	X	
		Wemos	X	X	
		CI-ROAP	X		
	YPRK	No applications			
Newer CSOs – founded in 1998 & after (n = 6)	KOAK	TIFA	X	X	
		INFID	X	X	
	KPMS	UNDP	X	X	
		TIFA	X	X	
	PAKTA	TAF	X	X	
		IFES	X	X	
		AusAID	X	X	
		Coca Cola	X	X	
		Various organizations			X
	SPEKHAM	Proposal under preparation			
	YPSDI	UNDP			
	Yayasan Law Coalition	Asia Foundation	X	X	
		AusAID	X	X	
		Ford Foundation	X	X	
		National Democratic Institute	X	X	
		Yayasan TIFA	X	X	

CSOs identified in **bold italics** have also generated income from commercial sales.

Beyond submitting proposals to donors other than USAID, CSSP has introduced the concept of internal resource generation, and sent several NGOs to a fund raising workshop in Manila that was subsequently followed by two in-country workshops. While the concept is not new to some of the older NGOs (e.g., LP3ES realizes some income from selling publications), many newer organizations find it difficult to accept. Some fear that too much emphasis on commercial ventures could distract them from their main mission, turning them into business or consultancy groups, while others shy away from any diversion from their civil society rationale – perhaps not surprising in a sector staffed largely by young idealists. Still others, however, have started to take advantage of previously realized opportunities such as charging fees for services (e.g. PAKTA Foundation offering short courses on website development through their training center, Bina Swagiri offering in-house capability for arranging training, facilitating workshops/seminar using the Technology of Participation approach, etc).

One further option toward building a self-sufficient civil society sector is corporate philanthropy, which has enjoyed some success in countries such as India, the Philippines and Thailand, but which has heretofore been largely unknown in Indonesia. Here CSSP along with other donors – particularly TAF and Ford Foundation – organized a gathering last April called "CEO to CEO Meeting on Corporate Social Responsibility," which involved the top management of BP and Shell oil corporations among others. The event ended with the CEOs in attendance each promising to bring 5 new CEOs for the next event with BP offering its office space, Shell volunteering to organize the event and PT Sigma Cipta Caraka offering their personnel for the administrative functions. Hopefully this initiative will lead to some serious corporate commitment to supporting civil society in Indonesia.

Performance Objective 4. Grants to Indonesian NGOs Awarded and Managed Effectively.

Under this heading of grant management, we have included attention to the grant monitoring and evaluation (M&E) process that also forms an integral component of CSSP, although it is managed within CSSP as a separate activity relating to all the POs.

Objective Statement. "The Contractor shall award and managed approximately 10-15 grants yearly to Indonesian NGOs and provide the technical and administrative services to these grantees. These grants will also support NGOs working in democracy-promotion, but will also support NGOs focusing on long-term civil society issues such as financial sustainability, domestic constituency building, and self-accreditation and self-regulation…." (contract, p. 12).

Results Indicators: The results targets outlined in the contract (p 16) are:

> Year 1 – Successful grant solicitation, general information, and/or review of unsolicited proposals for grants (as appropriate to the domestic political environment) undertaken semi-annually and as necessary. Proposals for grant funding are quickly and efficiently processed and awarded;
> Year 2 – Grants awarded are managed effectively;
> Year 3 – Regular grant monitoring, evaluation, close-out services and timely reporting provided to USAID and grantees.

General Findings. Though the *grant making* process proved a lengthy one, particularly in the program's first couple of years, CSSP has invested very significant and generally successful efforts to make potential CSOs with promising proposals become grantworthy organizations. The

monitoring and evaluation system initially underwent a sequence of problems, most of which were resolved, but other new ones have emerged ultimately from USAID/Washington to cause ongoing difficulties.

The grant making process. A combination of dual grant approval and embryonic CSO capability in grant application produced a very slow approval process (see Figure 4 for a graphic presentation of the system). The former meant extra reviewing time, while the latter necessitated much TA from CSSP to get potential grantees up to standard in their proposals (e.g., 85% of applicants had no previous experience in making proposals). These two factors led to an average 12-month process to approve grants, which all sides (CPT, CSSP and especially grantees themselves) thought far too long. More recent grants have come within 7-8 months.[39] In the year 2000, when CSSP got into full operating gear, there were 7 grantees. In 2001 there were 25 grantees, and in 2002, up to July, there have been 12 grantees. These 44 emerged from some 1,500 requests for funding, so the winnowing process has been severe.

The lack of CSO capability also meant problems of absorptive capacity – CSOs could not usefully spend grants of the size initially contemplated, so grant size had to be reduced significantly (average Rp. 1.1b). This meant a larger number of grants were possible (44 awarded through spring 2002), but CSSP management time had to expand to accommodate them (which necessitated more staff).

One important step – arguably the most important one – in grant management is the strengthening of potential CSOs to be eligible as CSSP grantees. At this stage (the box labeled "CSSP GM Visit" in Figure 4) CSSP provided TA like the training in PACSA, financial management, strategic planning, logical framework development, and workplan design. These efforts have contributed materially to grantee capacity to carry out their work agendas once the grants become available.[40]

We should note that virtually all the grantees we met had definite things to say about the grant awarding process. With only the barest hint at a question, the vast majority of grantees offered what soon became for the team a familiar litany. They found the grant process overlong, cumbersome and in some cases annoying (frequent comparisons were made with other less demanding donors). But almost all said that in the end they found it useful, particularly its financial management aspects, and that the experience had made them more effective organizations. There were a few older NGOs who found the elaborate CSSP training and consultation somewhat simple-minded ("we knew all that, why were they wasting our time?"), but the vast majority found it of great value despite the organizational pain it entailed. Some discounting is required, of course, when grant recipients bestow praise on donor practices, for after all most of them would like to obtain follow-on support for their programs, but the consistency of this "cod-liver oil" response (tastes-awful-but-it's-good-for-me) led the review team to conclude that the grant-making process was inducing some degree of real professionalization in the grantees.

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[39] A procedures manual (titled "How to be a Grant Manager") presently under preparation should help the process further.

[40] In a sense, this part of the training belongs under PO2 rather than PO4, for it is indeed building capacity, but in CSSP terms it belongs in the present discussion of PO4.

Figure 3. The Grant Making Process

Monitoring and evaluation. The development of an M&E system that would be both satisfactory by USAID/Washington standards and useful in tracking CSSP grant implementation has been difficult, for at least three reasons. First, an underlying problem has been that the two desiderata mentioned in the previous sentence have not implied necessarily similar systems by any means. USAID/Washington's concerns with Managing for Results, which led to the R4 reporting system with its IRs, indicators, etc., took up a considerable amount of management time without producing measurement tools that were much help to CSSP's operations. This system has, of course, been the subject of much protracted debate throughout the Agency, and is presently in process of reformulation (to a more qualitative approach, we hope).

A second problem impacting CSSP's ability to get an M&E system operating was the demands made by CPT on CSSP's M&E specialist in the first two years of the contract to help construct its own system, which meant that her ability to deal with CSSP's own M&E needs was correspondingly diminished. This difficulty has abated more recently, with decreased demands from CPT and a new M&E specialist on the CSSP team.

The third obstacle to a smoothly operating M&E system has again come from USAID/Washington in the form of the new yes/no performance measures specified for the 2002 annual report,[41] which are apparently destined to be replaced by yet another approach in the form of a Performance Monitoring Plan to be implemented in (we think) FY 2003.[42]

The cumulative effect of these constraining factors has been an unsure and changing M&E system that has proven confusing and troublesome for CPT, CSSP and the reporting grantees. CSSP has undertaken several attempts to deal with the situation. From the beginning it has employed the old "logical framework" approach of the 1980s, abandoned by USAID itself in the changeover to the R4 system, but useful to help grantees track what they are doing against the backdrop of a broader strategy and to help CSSP understand where they are going.

Grantees were also required to submit Semi-Annual Reports (SARs), using indicators chosen in consultation with the CSSP M&T specialist from a list of 16 assembled by CSSP. But this approach was then scrapped when USAID switched to the yes/no mechanism amid strong indications that another system would soon be coming (which is what the PMP turned out to be, we gather). Rather than train its grantees to use the yes/no tool and then have to train them again, CSSP has elected to ask their grantees to continue using the outcomes measures they had crafted as part of their logframe analyses, with CSSP taking responsibility for translating them into the appropriate yes/no answers. Then when PMP actually comes into effect for FY 2003, CSSP can begin using it with their grantees. Altogether, under the rapidly changing circumstances CSSP has faced on the M&E front over the past year or so, this appears to the team to have been a good path to take.

Financial monitoring has constituted a different activity at CSSP, with its end-of-grant audits and especially its required monthly financial reports using the QUICKBOOK software package. This financial tracking system, developed by Financial Management Specialist team at CSSP, can also be used as an early warning system to detect grant misallocation or misuse. An example here was PUSBIK Lampung, a Sumatran NGO dealing with local capacity building program for local legislatures, executives and communities in Bandar Lampung. In May 2001 PUSBIK be-

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[41] See "USAID 2002 Annual Report Indicators," Dated 3 December 2001.
[42] See CPT, "Revised Performance Monitoring Plan," n.d.

come a CSSP grantee, and seven months later in November CSSP found unusual items in the monthly financial report. CSSP then decided to send an independent auditor, who found significant misuse of funds by the director, and the grant was terminated. In another case, CSSP review of monthly reports identified what turned out to be an internal conflict between director and finance manager of KOAK Lampung, another local NGO dealing with anti-corruption issue. In this instance, it was possible to rectify the situation and the grant continued.

Special Activities Fund (SAF)

Purpose/Objective. The SAF is a mechanism under the CSSP to support short-term, discrete and event-based activities that allows the program to respond to issues arising in program implementation. The mechanism also allows USAID/I to respond to opportunities related to Indonesia's democratic transition

Results Indicators. No indicator was identified for this activity in the contract. Instead, illustrative examples were provided for its use, which included among others:

- Cost of production and printing of technical materials;
- Cost of special studies;
- Certain costs associated with organization and implementation of conferences, seminar, workshops, training programs, etc;
- Limited commodity and technical support for cooperating organizations; and
- Costs associated with receiving and briefing visiting professionals.

Findings. So far, 59 activities have been funded since the start of the program, and just over half (51%) of the $1.6 million allocation for the SAF has been expended. By year, there were 4 SAF activities in 1999, 34 in 2000, 18 in 2001 and 3 during the first six months of 2002.

The SAF-supported efforts appear to fall into two groups, with some supporting POs 1, 2 and 3, while others have largely assisted other USAID Mission SOs. Examples of more directly linked activities include:

- PO1 (advocacy) –
  - ➢ Civil Rights workshop/seminar on strategies to protect civil rights in Papua organized and presented by AIDP (an addition to the grant awarded to AIDP);
  - ➢ Human rights training and dialogues in Ilaga, Puncak Jaya and Bidogai, Nabire, arranged and facilitated by SKP in Jayapura (an example of an ad hoc award to an organization not a regular CSSP grantee).
- PO2 (capacity building) –
  - ➢ Financial management reporting and gender workshop for CSSP and USAID/CPT partners;
  - ➢ Journalist training for *Jubi* staff by ISAI
- PO3 (financial self-reliance) –
  - ➢ 8th Asia-Pacific Fundraising Workshop in Manila;
  - ➢ Fundraising training: In Search of Sustainability by ISAI

Some examples of SAF activities/events cutting across SOs are:

- Energy – Energy policy roundtable discussions; Women's energy meeting; Temu Kampung meetings to discuss impacts of subsidy lifting on energy prices and local development;
- NRM – Advocacy training for environmental group by Walhi;
- Economics – Regional dialogues synthesis and compilation workshops.

Beyond the POs and SOs categories, the activities funded under SAF can also be grouped according to thematic areas. Examples are:

- Peace and Conflict Resolution – Study tour to South Africa for truth and reconciliation and conflict management; Conflict resolution and peace building training for CSO and Community Leaders in Papua;
- Human Rights – Civil rights workshop/seminar for Papua; Attendance of 13 Indonesian Women representatives to the International War Crimes Tribunal 2000 in Tokyo; Training in Participatory Action Research in Trafficking of Women;
- Good Governance – Survey for and Publication of opinion poll for DPR, with evaluation; National NGO Conference: NGO and Democracy; Workshop on local autonomy;
- Media Development – Production of Public service announcements; Journalist training for Jubi staff; Press conference & talk show Re: Public TV transition; Tour to U.S., Canada, Korea to study public broadcasting;
- Legal System – Legal drafting training at Tulane University; National Law Commission hearings on Legal Reform;
- Planning – Farmers meeting to discuss development and local policy issues with government in East Java; regional dialogues synthesis and compilation workshop; etc.

Initially there was some uneasiness within CSSP that the SAF was being programmed overmuch by CPT for other SOs beside SO7, but over time a better understanding between the two entities developed, partly in consequence of personnel changes in both offices, but also because of efforts like a one-day retreat funded from the SAF that led to a improved relationship.[43]

Overall, we found the SAF to bring at least three definite benefits to the CSSP enterprise. First, it supported small, discrete activities that were additional to the main grant program but contributed to the POs. Some of these were undertaken by regular CSSP grantees (e.g., the AlDP workshop on civil rights), while others were conducted by organizations having no other links to CSSP (for example, human rights training offered by SKP). Secondly, SAF-funded efforts functioned to publicize CSSP to non-grantees, particularly in workshop settings. For instance, AlDP, Foker and LPPMA – all human rights CSOs in Papua – first learned of CSSP in SAF-supported workshops and then applied successfully for grants. Third, it permitted a number of initiatives (e.g., travel to foreign workshops) that appeared to benefit CSOs but which could not have been funded under the regular grant program.

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[43] Several CSSP members mentioned the retreat as an important event in creating better relations between CSSP and CPT.

III. CSSP and Mission Management Issues: a consolidated list

In its SOW, CPT specified a number of "specific CSSP and Mission Management Issues" to be addressed by the evaluation team. The SOW listed nine such issues (see Annex C, pp. 69-70), but a review by the team indicated that they could be boiled down to four essential queries, which are listed below. We hope that our answers to these four questions will address all the major issues CPT is interested in.

a. Was the original design adequate to the task contemplated? How did the program changes introduced in late FY 2000 change things?

Given Indonesia's sheer size and the uncertain political environment obtaining in 2000, the national scope laid out for CSSP was probably too ambitious. As the Mission's 2000 CSP observed, the "Agency alone cannot leverage reform" (p 4). The change to a regional strategy was well taken, at least on the civil society and governance front. The provincial focus has been significantly more manageable for both CSSP and CPT.

b. Has CSSP met the objectives set forth in the contract?

CSSP is on track in meeting all the objectives as of the half-way point in LOP. See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the objectives by PO.

c. How does CSSP perceive its relationship with CPT?

In the program's early stages, CPT was perceived as having too much hands-on control, but given the macro-political sensitivities of that period in the context of USG diplomatic needs, the close supervision was probably justified. Ironically, at this same time, CSSP thought itself being encouraged to downplay its USAID sponsorship and give that connection a low profile, leading some in the Indonesian community (as well as other donors) to wonder if CSSP were an autonomous granting agency when in fact it was being quite tightly managed by USAID. As Indonesian political anxieties eased and new management came on board at CPT, program control from the Mission side became more relaxed, and a significantly more comfortable relationship has been realized. CSSP now sees itself more as a partner, though various aspects of the supervisory relationship continue to be tighter than it would prefer in terms of the grant award process and grant management. The reality is that CSSP continues to be a contract with a shorter-than-normal leash, a condition that CSSP has shown itself willing to accept and perform well within.

d. What are the linkages between CSSP/CPT and other Mission SOs? With other USAID-supported DG players (TAF and the CPT apart from CSSP)? How are these linkages faring?

These linkages appear to be less well developed than they could or should be in all these directions. CSSP has few linkages with other Mission SO teams (aside from some informal exchanges with the DLG team), but then then CPT has not particularly encouraged such relationships. As for relations between CPT and other SO teams, the review team cannot comment at any length, as its need to focus on the contractor and its grantees in depth has precluded it from spending as much time as it would have liked with people at the Mission.

CSSP relations with other donors and USAID grantees operating in the civil society arena appeared cordial and sometimes productive (e.g., the initiative taken with the Ford and Asia Foundations to interest CEOs in sponsoring democratization efforts), though they could probably be intensified with benefit to all parties. There appears to be much less interaction between CSSP and USAID-supported grantees or contractors operating outside the DG field (e.g, the PHN-supported FHI and its grantee YOSANTO in Papua, with which some helpful advocacy synergies might be effected, given the important role that advocacy efforts have come to assume for NGOS working in the HIV/AIDS sector).

IV. Major issues

At the presentation session held on 24 July 2002 at USAID/Jakarta, presided over by Mission Director Terry Myers and attended by the CPT as well as other interested parties at the Mission, a number of new issues emerged in which the director and others expressed strong interest. The list below represents a distillation of those issues, as vetted with CPT team leader Michael Calavan and CSSP's CTO Robert Hansen on 26 July. These eight issues are addressed in this chapter of the report. To these eight, we add a ninth, for the thrust of our main recommendations suggesting a change in CSSP's direction during its final two years leads us to conclude that the benchmarks and expected results set forth in the original contract would also need changing.

1. **CSO survival.** How many if any supported CSOs can be expected to survive on their own at EOP? Short of answering that, what degree of self-sufficiency might be expected of (at least some) CSOs?

2. **Comparative advantage.** What comparative advantage(s) has CSSP developed vis-à-vis other USAID SO initiatives? Other CPT efforts? Activities sponsored by other donors?

3. **Prioritizing.** What are the real core elements of CSSP? What ought we be thinking should stand as CSSP's principal attainments at EOP, especially in view of what is likely to become diminished funding during the program's remaining lifetime?

4. **Institutionalizing capacity building.** How might the capacity building capabilities developed over the course of CSSP be institutionalized into an enduring legacy?

5. **Coordination among CSSP grantees.** What kinds of coordination (networking, etc.) could be established among CSSP grantees? Between CSSP grantees and those assisted by other CO teams?

6. **Coordination between SOs.** What kinds of coordination could be established between the SO teams at USAID/Jakarta?

7. **Balance between PO2 and PO4.** During the remainder of LOP, what should be the balance between emphasizing new grants (PO4) vs. building further capacity among present (or completed) grantees (PO2)?

8. **Building model programs.** Here the team was asked to flesh out our ideas about building model programs in selected provinces that would form the critical legacy of CSSP: Papua and Aceh on conflict reduction/human rights, and East Java on general decentralized governance.

9. (added). **Modfying the contract.** If the recommendations made in this report are followed, what would be the impact on the guidelines set out in the CSSP contract?

Issue 1. CSO survival

How many if any supported CSOs can be expected to survive on their own at the program's end? Short of answering that, what degree of self-sufficiency might be expected of (at least some) CSOs?

We can begin our answer to this question with several observations. First, some of the older ones like LP3ES, LPKP and Foker would endure, most surely, for they had been managing on their own before CSSP arrived on the scene, and indeed had even managed to carry on under the New Order regime. And at least a few of the newer ones such as AlDP have likely picked up enough organizational skills independently of CSSP support to continue on when their funding ends. Secondly, there are a few older CSOs that will eventually collapse on their own, despite whatever short-term life-support they can get from donors. And correspondingly, a number of the newer organizations will not remain on the scene beyond the end of donor support, for they are just not capable of mastering the skills they would need to survive. Given the newness of so much of civil society in Indonesia, there are probably more of these latter groups than we would like to think.

If we ask how many CSOs that would otherwise have perished at EOP will CSSP have helped survive, the question becomes much more difficult to answer. The odds in many ways are not favorable, for several reasons. First, as noted just above, civil society itself is only in the first blush of life in the post-Suharto era. Compared with other political systems in the region emerging from authoritarian rule in the past 15 years or so – Bangladesh, the Philippines and Thailand are obvious examples – there was almost no earlier experience of civil activism to fall back on for inspiration, guidance or just plain inertial momentum. For most CSOs, everything has to be learned from scratch. Secondly and compounding the first problem, so many newer CSOs were begun by idealistic younger people, still in or just out of university. They brought with them the energy and enthusiasm required to launch a successful enterprise, but they lacked the experience and practical knowledge needed to make things work over time. Thirdly, CSSP grants tend to be fairly short. Of the first 44 grants made, half were for 12 months or less, while only two were for longer than 18 months. Shorter grants make good sense, given the finite size of the CSSP portfolio, the modest absorptive capacity of most CSOs and the need to support a wide variety of organizations in a the time allotted, but this practice also means less time and attention can be devoted to helping any particular CSO build long-term skills in self-sustainability.

Fourthly, the political atmosphere that was so euphoric and encouraging at the beginning of the transition has faded somewhat in the time since then. The Megawati government is still supportive of civil society but not to the extent that Gus Dur's and Habibie's governments were. In a confrontation between a civil society coalition and the military – say regarding human rights issues – would the Megawati government be as concerned with democratic rights as the previous regimes were? The fact that it makes sense to ask such questions indicates that they have a resonance today that they did not possess a little while ago. Finally, if Indonesia is like so many other new democracies, citizen enthusiasm for public issues (and public service) is likely to decline as time goes on, with the result that it will become successively less easy to recruit new cohorts of idealistic young people to fill CSO ranks vacated by their older compatriots who – if they resemble their counterparts elsewhere – gradually withdraw to get on with their careers and families.

On the most positive side we can point to some factors favoring CSO survival. First, the Yayasan (foundation) Law 16 of 2000 has served as enabling legislation allowing a relatively firm legal footing for CSO. An officially registered yayasan can acquire assets from foreign governments and organizations. It must have a certain structure (a management body, period of appointment of officers, method of replacing officer vacancies, periodic meetings, and the like), which could be seen as restrictive, but could also be interpreted as mandating a certain minimum degree of professionalism for the NGO community. The state's powers to dissolve yayasans (e.g., court findings that public order and morality have been violated, inability to settle debts) can be viewed in the same light. These provisions could lead to repression, but they could also serve to ensure a degree of responsibility and sound management within the NGO sector.

A second factor favoring survival is the presence of other donors. AusAID, DfID, Ford, TAF, and UNDP all have democracy grant support programs, as well as a number of Dutch organizations like HIVOS and NOVIB.   This is not to say that if CSSP support ends for a CSO, another donor is going automatically to take up the slack. Indeed, if Indonesia is like other countries, donors will tend to move in tandem, so that assistance rises and declines among all of them more or less simultaneously. Only time will tell whether Indonesia is to follow the curve of such varied countries as the Philippines, El Salvador and Poland, where democracy assistance jumped sharply up after a democratic transition but then declined again within a few years as donors moved to needs and opportunities elsewhere. So it may well be that the potential budget cuts looming on the USAID/Jakarta horizon are mirrored among other donors too. Still, the fact that a sizeable group of donors exists means that any single CSO has more than one chance to obtain support at any given time – to be cut off from a specific donor does not necessarily mean an organizational death sentence.

Thirdly, a number of NGOs do have belt-tightening potentials somewhat like those that can be resorted to by small family-run businesses, in that staff can take salary cuts or work part-time to tide the organization over until better times emerge. This kind of subsidy cannot go on forever in most cases – people do have to get on with their lives – but it can serve as a short-term buffer. As an example, the current chairperson of AlDP in Jayapura is a young lawyer who practices her profession to support her civil society work, while several of her CSO colleagues work as lecturers at local universities for the same purpose.

A final favorable factor lies in the possibility of internal resource generation that a few CSOs have started to take on, such as membership fees, commercial sales (e.g., of publications), service provision and the like.

Aside from these generalities, we do have some data from a survey that CSSP has been conducting that has so far included 16 grantees. The sample thus constitutes a bit more than one-fourth of the total 44 grantees supported by CSSP at the time of our review. Moreover the cases have been added as it became possible to collect the data rather than on the basis of any scientific design (which would have been extremely difficult in any event, given the diverse range of locations and activities represented by the total 44 organizations). So the survey is at best illustrative, not statistically valid.

Even so, we can glean some interesting information from Table 4. Of the five older (founded before the 1998 democratic transition) CSOs sampled, three had found other funding sources and

in each case had received support from at least three other donor organizations.[44] Among the 11 newer (1998 and after) groups, six had obtained such assistance, with five of these six receiving funding from two donors each. Altogether, then, nine of the 16 organizations, or just over half, had received financial support from new sources.   The survey also revealed that one of the older CSOs has split into factions after internal squabbling among the leadership, while one newer group had ceased operations altogether.   Finally, three groups had managed to generate some income from selling services.

This small sample of CSOs does not make the case that CSSP will have created a self-sufficient civil society that can endure and thrive after the program ends, but it does indicate that at least some of them are acquiring skills that will help them survive over time.

Issue 2. Comparative advantage

What comparative advantage(s) has CSSP developed vis-à-vis other USAID SO initiatives? Other CPT efforts? Activities sponsored by other donors?

Three aspects of CSSP in particular stood out to the review team as signal accomplishments of the program. In all three areas, CSSP has displayed a high degree of professionalism and commitment, and has proven itself highly effective. Grantees and subgrantees commented positively at some length on all these efforts. Our strong impression is that CSSP does these things better than others in the field, especially in the grant-making area, but also in the other two discussed here. But the team cannot say definitively that CSSP has a comparative advantage over other Mission SO initiatives or CPT efforts or other donors in any of these program areas, simply because we could not conduct any systematic comparisons – to do so would have been well beyond our authorized level of effort. So we will have to say that in each of these spheres, CSSP has done very well indeed and should be commended for its work.

Open-ended grant-making process. To judge from what we say and heard, a signal accomplishment of the CSSP project has been its efforts to assist new NGOs to become eligible as grantees for funding and its continuing commitment to nurture their organizational development after that. In the explosive growth of NGOs that took place after Suharto's departure from power, very few of them had any clear sense of vision or mission with anything like a viable work plan. Realizing this condition, CSSP has developed an excellent system for culling out NGOs with promise and cultivating that promise into something that would prove grantworthy. Although this grant application process was laborious (on both sides) and took a long time compared to other donors' procedures, at the end of the day these new grantee had learned how to make an appropriate proposal to donors, how to develop a financial management system and how to define a logical framework for their young organizations. By doing so, some of them are now applying for new funding elsewhere, such as KOAK Lampung, IDEA Yogyakarta, SEAPA, etc.

Financial management systems. This has been a strong component of the CSSP program and has been the one commented on most often (and often most positively) by grantees, as we have

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[44] A number of the CSOs shown in Table 4 were reluctant to share data on just how much funding they were receiving from each of these sources, citing government tax issues among other considerations. Given enough resources and time, it would be possible to query the donors involved to find out how much support they had given, but it was beyond our capacity to conduct such an investigation. In addition to the three older CSOs receiving support, two more attempted but failed to obtain other donor funding.

noted elsewhere in this report at some length. But presumably other SO teams in health, environment, etc., demand similar levels of skills – after all, they must answer to the same auditing requirements faced by CPT – and so provide similar training to their grantees. And TAF told the team that as a USG-funded agency they must make equally strict demands of their grantees. So while CSSP does very well indeed at getting its grantees to institutionalize food financial management, it is in all likelihood not alone in this respect.

Advocacy training. We strongly suspect that this may be a comparative advantage for CSSP, but again time and resources did not permit more than a brief peek through the 360° periscope at non-CSSP-funded organizations, so we cannot say for sure. But even though other SO teams (as well as other initiatives within the CPT itself) may encourage advocacy, doing so is not their central substantive mission as it is with CSSP. For this reason we think it would be worth looking into how CSSP promotes advocacy compared with other USAID units. The purpose here would not be to assess who does it best, for this would be hard indeed to determine. All advocacy efforts can be gauged on the advocacy ladder, we would say, and so general progress can be assessed, but it would be difficult to say just how hard it is to move a step higher in HIV/AIDS as against, say, organizing water consumers or protecting human rights. Instead, the purpose of a comparative study would be to uncover techniques and approaches to advocacy that could be shared across sectors to mutual advantage. Such a study would make an excellent SAF grant.

Issue 3. Prioritizing

What are the core elements of CSSP that should endure as its legacy and should be concentrated upon during the remainder of LOP, especially in view of what is likely to become diminished funding over that time?

The limits of reasonable ambition. USAID by itself (and even the entire donor community collectively) cannot inspire the transformation of Indonesian civil society into a vibrant, pluralist dynamo delivering participation and accountability at all levels. Such a goal would have been beyond the reach of donors in the Philippines, a significantly smaller policy much further along on the democratization trajectory, and this is even more so the case in Indonesia. As the Jakarta Mission's 2000 Country Strategy Paper noted, the "Agency alone cannot leverage [fundamental] reform" (p. 4). And now the very real likelihood looms that over the remaining life of the program, allocations will be significantly less than had been initially anticipated. But even with a lower ambition and reduced funding, it should be possible to set into place several significant legacies. The first would be the foundation for two types of *civil society development at the provincial level*, one centering on *human rights and conflict reduction* and the other on *a more general model of civil society activism*. A third priority aims at *institutionalizing capacity building* for CSOs through civil society service provider organizations. Finally, continued support to the *media* can materially contribute to institutionalizing its critical role in safeguarding democratic freedom in Indonesia. These three priorities are spelled out below in more detail.

Three provincial strategies. The three programs sketched out just below build on CSSP's three major province-level efforts in Papua, Aceh and East Java. Whether measured by the number of grants awarded (including those in the pipeline to be awarded) or by the amount collectively allocated, these three provinces represent CSSP's major investment to date, as is clear from a glance at Table 5.

Table 5. Grants inventory by province, as of June 2002

Number of grants

Province	East Java	West Java	East Kali-mantan	North. Sula-wesi	Aceh	Papua	Total
Completed & current grants	9	3	3	1	4	5	25
Grants in pipeline	6	3	4	4	1	2	20
Total grants	15	6	7	5	5	7	45

Grant funds allocated (Rp million)

Province	East Java	West Java	East Kali-mantan	North. Sula-wesi	Aceh	Papua	Total
Completed & current grants	6.001	3.187	1.163	0.715	6.417	9.532	27.015
Grants in pipeline	4.098	3.165	3.123	4.416	0.672	1.245	16.719
Total grants	10.099	6.352	4.286	5.131	7.089	10.777	43.734

Note: Data shown here do not include grants to CSOs in other provinces or national organizations.

Human rights and conflict reduction. CSSP's programs in Papua and Aceh have launched impressive efforts focusing on human rights and conflict reduction amid political environments that at best can be characterized as somber. The challenge is now to institutionalize those efforts into a coherent whole that can endure and prosper beyond LOP.

As noted elsewhere in this report, the prospects for human rights and conflict reduction in Papua are sobering indeed. The current political scene combines a repressive and violent military (and police) encouraged indirectly if not openly by Jakarta, a central government long known for its arrogance and intolerance toward the indigenous population, a rich natural resource base largely regarded as sites for plunder by non-Papuans, the beginnings of a potentially volatile fundamentalist religious offensive, and a long-simmering but in all probability doomed independence movement. In Aceh, the central government has been less arrogant toward locals, and the religious divide is essentially absent, but the GAM independence movement is arguably in a stronger position than the OPM in Papua, and the military repression in consequence more severe.[45] Despoliation of resources by outsiders and concomitant denial of benefit to locals perhaps not as intense but is nonetheless roughly similar to what has been occurring in Papua.

The basic challenge amid such unpromising prospects over the next five to ten years is not to construct a flourishing civil society on Tocquevillean lines of the sort imagined to exist in ad-

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[45] At least at the time of the CSSP mid-term review. Almost every day's news reports alleged GAM rebels killed by the Army (see e.g., Ibnu Mat Noor, "14 killed in Aceh, thousands take refuge," *Jakarta Post*, 27 July 2002, p 5).

vanced Western countries, but rather to enable local citizens to build a sustainable set of civil society institutions that will engage the state to reduce violence and protect human rights.

A model for local civil society activism. While Aceh and Papua constitute special cases of concern among CSSP's three more mature provincial programs, East Java stands as a more "typical" province less beset by violence and conflict. And it is in this less convulsed East Javan setting that CSSP can work on developing a civil society model able to endure past LOP and replicable in other provincial settings. One of CSSP's newer provincial programs in East Kalimantan, North Sulawesi or West Java could also be harnessed to this task. Indeed, the prospect of crafting a model would likely prove considerably easier in either of the first two provinces, given their much smaller populations – around two million each, as of 2000, compared with 34 million in East Java and 32 million in West Java). But East Java has the head start, with nine grants completed or well under way and six in the pipeline, in addition to the City Forum program operating there, as against far fewer in the other three provinces, as is clear in Table 5 below. The East Java program also has a resident grant manager, whose proximity will doubtless prove a critical factor in building a provincial model.

Further thoughts on building these two types of model program will be offered below in connection with Issue 8.

Institutionalizing capacity building. The most striking common characteristic displayed by CSSP grant applicants has been their near universal lack of experience with even the rudiments of NGO professionalism. There have been a few with track records that have enabled them to accumulate basic (or in some cases even sophisticated) ability to design strategies and work plans, draw up budgets, show financial management capacity in place, etc. But most applicants are the product of the post-1998 democratic dispensation or the period immediately leading up to the transition of that year. Accordingly, their principal dynamic has consisted of an enthusiastic passion for some aspect of democracy, generally accompanied by little capability for putting that passion into concerted action. Thus except for a very few cases, virtually all of the 1500 applications received by CSSP were at the outset basically unworthy of grant approval.

In consequence, a great deal of CSSP management effort has been directed toward bringing potential grantees up to a grantworthy level of capability, through workshops, individual counseling and site visits, and endless proposal reviews and requests for resubmission. Other donors have undertaken this kind of capacity building also,[46] but our strong impression is that CSSP has managed the task exceedingly well. Our thoughts on institutionalizing this kind of capacity building are offered below in the context of Issue 4.

Media as a critical civil society factor. CSSP stands as only one of several players supporting the media in Indonesia. CPT has made direct grants to Internews and Yayasan Seth among others, while the Asia Foundation and IFES (apart from its role as a CSSP consortium member) have been notable for their support of a free media. CSSP does not have an overall media strat-

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[46] It would be worthwhile to undertake a comparative analysis on this aspect of civil society support, say between CSSP, TAF, Ford, UNDP and other donors, for there is surely a rich experience that could usefully be shared among these donors. But such a task would have been well beyond our Scope of Work. Hopefully it could become the focus of another study, perhaps to be sponsored by some other donor(s) in conjunction with USAID.

egy in the sense that it has had a provincial strategy, but rather has supported media initiatives on a discrete ad hoc basis as proposals have come in.[47]

The review team was able to meet with five media-related CSSP grantees, as well as one direct CPT grantee (*Jubi*). Of these six, five have been focusing on transparency issues, three at national level (LKM, ISAI and IDEA), while one dealt with the provincial level (*Jubi*) and one the kabupaten (YPSDI). The sixth CSO (SEAPA) concerned itself with protecting journalists amid an increasing incidence of violence directed against them, as well as pressing for a freedom-of-information act and nurturing the journalistic community as a civil society constituency.

The two local level organizations fit nicely into the provincial programs discussed above and so should be considered in that context as essential elements in those civil society initiatives. The national level efforts deserve support in their own right. Uncovering malfeasance and protecting the journalists who do so are absolutely key to democratic sustainability; absent these two components, no democracy can survive very long. Accordingly, even though they don't exactly match up with the provincial aspects of what is being suggested as CSSP's core elements, these media support efforts should be maintained through LOP. We would rate media support as a third priority, coming after the provincial civil society models and institutionalizing capacity building.

A cautionary note. In urging that Papua, Aceh and East Java become the model legacy provinces, we do not wish to suggest that CSSP efforts in the other three provinces be terminated, or that new grantees in the pipeline be abandoned before receiving any support, especially after all the demands that have been made of them and which they have extended themselves to meet. To do so would most certainly be seen as very bad donor behavior in Indonesian civil society circles, perhaps even more widely. Instead, we are recommending that these provinces be given special attention as forming the legacy of CSSP – its enduring contribution to Indonesian democratization.

Issue 4. Institutionalizing Capacity Building

How might the capacity building capabilities developed over the course of CSSP be institutionalized into an enduring legacy?

As mentioned in the section on PO2 in Chapter two, the development of capacity building under CSSP has performed strongly with its financial management system and strategic planning training. Grantees have become empowered through a financial discipline that constitutes a first step on the way to self-sufficiency and through an ability to chart their course beyond current program activity.

An institutionalized capacity to provide expertise, counseling and training to CSOs – what might be called TA for civil society – should become a high CSSP priority over the final 2+ years of the project. USAID's Europe and Eurasia region offers a number of examples of entrepreneurial CSO leaders forming what have come to be known as "intermediate service organizations" or ISOs that offer just this kind of TA on a fee-for-service basis to the NGO community in their re-

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[47] An exception here might be CSSP's support for TVRI, the main government television operation, as it transited into becoming an independent public broadcasting enterprise. But that work had been essentially completed some time before the review team's appearance and so was not included in our assessment.

spective countries.[48] Closer to home, USAID/Manila's recently completed civil society program fostered the development of similar organizations in the Philippines, such as the Venture for Fund Raising, the Philippine Council for NGO Certification, and the Philippine Council for NGO Certification.[49]

In Indonesia, at least three NGOs – PAKTA, INSIST and Satu Nama – have the potential to become such civil society service providers, and in a sense have already served in this capacity by providing TA to CSSP through workshops, software development and the like. But their relationship with CSSP has been essentially a contractual one, with these organizations providing specific services funded by the SAF.   We would encourage some thinking at CSSP and CPT directed at helping these three organizations (and perhaps others to be identified – a large country like Indonesia could use several of them) to become self-sustaining ISOs that could function indefinitely on a fee-for-service basis. Perhaps they have already attained this degree of self-sufficiency (we didn't think to put such a question to them at the time of interview, though in retrospect it would have been an excellent idea), or perhaps they could do so with some support from CSSP.

With a little evangelizing from CPT, it should be possible to interest other SO teams in this prospect and indeed other donors as well, so gathering the support – and even the funding – for institutionalizing civil service capacity building should not prove very expensive for CPT or CSSP. Certainly the other SO teams should have as much incentive to create an ongoing capacity building capability within the Indonesian NGO community. And the job should not prove to be hugely difficult, for all three organizations gave us the impression that they would very much like to function in such a role and indeed had begun to do so already.

One further dimension to be explored along this line is building similar capacities at the provincial level. If CSSP is to move substantially toward creating a serious and sustainable civil society presence at provincial level as we are urging in this report, a capacity building NGO in each province would be extremely useful and likely essential. But the review team did not run across any candidate organizations eager and waiting in the wings to be assigned this role. In East Java, LPKP in Malang as a new grantee and Bina Swagiri in Tuban as a likely grantee both struck us as possibilities, but both these organizations, now concentrating on village governance, would take considerable strengthening to assume this larger task.[50] Perhaps they could be helped along with assistance from one or more of the three macro-level organizations noted above, who would thus become national capacity builders of provincial capacity building NGOs.

We also offer some ideas of some more specific ways to build capacity over the longer term, which might be incorporated into an initiative to build an ISO institution or to supplement such an effort:

- Periodic publication and distribution of quick reference materials. These could take a bulletin form focusing on what works, where it is working, what processes were involved, what were the results, names and address of people involved. Such quick reference materials, featuring a topic for every issue, could be informative and descriptive in a

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[48] For more on these ISOs, see Biddle et al. (1999).
[49] Some of these Philippine developments are discussed in Blair (2002).
[50] There may well be other NGOs in this large province of 34 million people that are better suited to the job envisioned here. We were able to visit only a few groups during our short stay.

very short manner (2 pages, back-to-back) basically for information of all NGO partners and could be a source for future in-depth studies in highlighting "good practices".

- Developing Guidebooks and/or Workbooks - This could be one volume or divided into a set that could feature:
    a) Who are the donors in Indonesia, what are their priority concerns, what kind of activities they support, their addresses, and the names of contact person;
    b) How to prepare project proposal for donors featuring elements of good proposal, sample proposals, budget and work plans;
    c) a guide to financial management;
    d) Monitoring and Evaluation guidelines,
    e) Advocacy guidelines and analyses of successful advocacy efforts in the Indonesian context.
- Support to institutions either CSOs or academics to develop training materials and act as service providers in such areas as project preparation, financial management, financial self-reliance, ToP, etc. A very concrete example is The Asia Foundation's "Indonesia Rapid Decentralization Appraisal." Rather than hiring competent individuals in rapid appraisal system, TAF engaged institutional services in order to build the capacity of these institutions to conduct the studies.
- Documenting best-practice experience on advocacy from different grantees also would be good material for sharing. Such documentation might include best practice according to thematic subjects such as dealing with BPDs on accommodating local advocacy efforts, or promoting *Pemda* budget transparency.

Issue 5. Coordination among CSSP grantees

What kinds of coordination (networking, etc.) could be established among CSSP grantees? Between CSSP grantees and those assisted by other SO teams?

CSSP has begun a very promising venture in grantee networking with its MIRPP (Matching Issues, Resources, People and Priorities) in East Java. The initiative was launched with a workshop in April 2002 that generated considerable interest that we hope it will be possible to follow up on. MIRPP is a low-cost, systematic approach to matching and prioritizing issues or needs with resources or cash and people or technical skills. It assumes that every organization has untapped human resources and useful skills, which can fruitfully be explored and extended to other organizations. Some MIRPP precepts are that:

- local knowledge is valuable – often more so than the technological sophistication that outsiders bring;[51]
- CSOs want to reduce dependency on costly external service providers.

MIRPP should be able to accommodate differences in scale and special interests among CSOs, even niche concerns. During the initial meeting held in April in Surabaya, CSO participants pointed out that participation in large CSO forums has not generally had much impact on their organization or their programs. This they feel has been due primarily to major sectoral differ-

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[51] Students of development will recognize here ideas that resonate with Robert Chambers' longstanding advocacy for "local people's knowledge" – the concept that locals often understand a great deal more about development issues pertinent to their situation than outsiders peddling lore from the "world shelf of knowledge." See for instance Chambers (1983).

ences among members. They suggested that smaller network of like-minded committed CSOs would do better at generating and sharing experience and best practices.

The MIRPP approach can also generate itself spontaneously, as appears to have been the case among CSSP grantees in East Kalimantan, who have informally adopted it on their own. Elsewhere, MIRPP circles should be relatively straightforward to launch, as in Papua, where a number of CSO grantees are working on human rights and conflict reduction issues. Initially, it would probably be advisable to start with CSSP grantees, enabling them to build on what has already been a common experience in working through the challenging grant process – a kind of CSO "boot camp" that has made them all into more capable organizations. As MIRPP-generated knowledge builds up and momentum is generated, then other CSOs could be taken into the collective.

Issue 6. Coordination Among SOs

What kinds of coordination could be established between the SO teams at USAID Jakarta?

Coordination and synergy constitute two words that most USAID missions talk about a great length, but their realization has been elusive, despite continuous pronouncements and Mission Orders. It is an ongoing saga that missions struggle with, seeking answers and results. One prominent prescription has been to create a missionwide "expanded team" composed of Office Chiefs and "ambassadors" from various SOs. But generally after one or two session featuring a gathering of SO emissaries, the issue is soon lost in the radar screen. Even attempts to allocate some actual funding for coordination under each program/project, as in the Philippines during the early 1990s, failed to have significant results.

For CSSP specifically, the team had two chances to observe inter-SO coordination in the field. In East Java, where there might have been expected to be significant linkages between CSSP's City Forum program and DLG's Perform initiative, we failed to find it. Neither program appeared to have much idea of what the other one was doing or any real interest in finding out about the other one. Given the considerable overlap in their activities and objectives, in addition to their common ancestry in the earlier CLEAN Urban project, this seemed especially unfortunate. In Papua, on the other hand, where we might have anticipated no linkage between CSSP's activities and the HPN sector, there was a relationship between CSSP grantee Foker and HPN grantee FHI – at least to the extent that people knew each other at the Jayapura office and seemed have a fair idea of what each other were engaged in. It was unclear, however, to what extent the potentials of such a relationship had been exploited (e.g., FHI's subgrantee Yasanto might have learned a great deal from the Foker-sponsored work in Merauke, but this had apparently not yet begun to occur).

The explanation for the disconnectedness between SOs appears to lie in some combination of the following factors:[52]

- Issues of coordination and synergy are virtually never part of program/project design or evaluation criteria nor are they part of the contract. Mission staff do not assign any importance to coordination and synergy in project design or in tender documents. Neither

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[52] For an insightful analysis of how and why DG programs in particular gain less from potential cross-sectoral synergies than might be hoped, see Lippman (2001).

foreign service officers nor foreign service nationals advance their careers by devoting time and energy to the needs of other SOs.

- SO teams work with various contractors and/or grantees that have different implementation strategies, sets of activities, time frames and tasks to be accomplished. A contractor's Chief of Party has his mind set on his performance objectives and how they can be accomplished so that his organization is rated well by the Mission and his company recognizes accomplishments that form the basis for his continuing engagement. Each COP has little built-in incentive to coordinate with other SOs or their respective Chiefs of Party.
- Turfing and personality differences among mission office chiefs, program officers and chiefs of party are always evident but rarely admitted or discussed openly. While some are open to coordinative activities, others are simply not.
- Everyone is tasked but no one is in charge.

Suggestions:

- Putting someone in the Mission in charge of inter-SO coordination. This individual, either a direct hire or PSC, should be the point person for coordination, who will continue to explore and remind everyone of opportunities or avenues of SO coordination. His/her performance at the task would become a part of what gets evaluated in the annual Personnel Evaluation Review. Coordination would also become a significant responsibility of office chiefs/program officers and included in their annual reviews.
- Issuing periodic newsletter/emails that will include planned/future program activities and identifying opportunities for collaboration. If created in the Webpage, it should list planned activities of various SOs, identifying which other SOs can be involved, and should allow contractors to update their planned activities. Emails to office chiefs and chief of parties can also be done regularly as a supplementary mechanism.
- Identifying what resources are needed and where to secure them. While some SOs may have PD&S-type funds incorporated in their programs, others may not. With reduced budget levels in future years and shrinking OE funds, some arrangements may have to be worked out to fund coordination activities among and between SOs.
- Holding periodic Chiefs of Party meetings, with coordination and synergy always prominently on the agenda. Each participant could be asked to share a copy of activities identifying opportunities for inter-SO coordination. Meetings should take place once a month or perhaps once every quarter depending on the need as determined by the Mission.
- Engaging high-level leadership. Given the many institutional constraints inhibiting SO coordination, in the end only a determined effort led by the mission director can assure its success. This kind of initiative is not a chore to be delegated to lower-ranking officers.

Issue 7. Balance between PO2 and PO4

During the remainder of LOP, what should be the balance between emphasizing new grants (PO4) vs building further capacity among present (or completed) grantees (PO2)?

The question here ostensibly asks how much emphasis should be placed on new grant-making (PO4) as against working with present grantees to build capacity (PO2). In a very real sense, however, given the very strong probability of an imminent reduction in CSSP funding, the query

will become effectively moot: new grants will have to be cut back, perhaps sharply.[53] The real issue, then, is how best to steer PO2 during the remaining LOP. We have addressed this topic at some length above in our thoughts on Issue 4.

Issue 8. Building model programs

Here the team was asked to flesh out our ideas about building model programs in selected provinces that would form the critical legacy of CSSP: Papua and Aceh on conflict reduction/human rights; and East Java on general decentralized governance.

Our concept of a model provincial program centers on a coherent and purposeful and sustainable civil society presence that as an entity can survive the end of CSSP support. If present program trajectories are maintained, at CSSP's end there should be in place a good number of CSOs performing useful and even critical functions in strengthening civil society participation and accountability in governance. But the net result will not be more than the several good works produced by these discrete initiatives; the whole will equal the sum of the parts if all works well, but unless some other donor steps in to fill the gap left by a departing CSSP, that sum as well as the parts themselves can be expected to lose momentum and integrity over time. And even if other revenue sources can sustain these efforts in place, they will continue at best as a collection of discrete activities without a collective purpose. The challenge, then, is to craft a strategy that will leave as CSSP's legacy the foundation for a civil society in the large that will endure into the future.[54]

The exact strategies needed to produce such an outcome in our three suggested provinces of Papua, Aceh and East Java will of course have to be determined by CSSP and CPT with input from the USAID/Jakarta Program Office to assure maximal fit with other ongoing USAID-assisted initiatives in these provinces. But we do have some suggestions that we hope will be useful in this effort. Our recommendations necessarily deal with the two provinces that we were able to visit during our brief mid-term review, Papua and East Java, but we would hope that many of our suggestions regarding Papua could be adapted to the context prevailing in Aceh as well.

Papua. A Papua civil society program (and by extension an analogous one in Aceh) should focus fairly narrowly on issues of human rights and conflict reduction, for these problem areas loom more than large enough to occupy the full attention of any program that CSSP could mount. To the extent that such efforts are successful, program focus could later expand to other areas like gender, labor, environment, or occupational groups,[55] but for the present, the concentration should remain as at present on the two paramount issues. The goal, then, would be to put into place a coherent, coordinated and sustainable mechanism able to defend human rights and reduce conflict in a precarious (unfavorable might be a better word here) situation of indeterminate duration. CSSP's remaining two years may well not be sufficient time to ensure such an outcome, but it should allow time to get a solid foundation for it well under way.

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[53] In saying this, we do want to reinforce our the cautionary note inserted at the end of our discussion of Issue 7 above, namely that grants already in the pipeline but not yet actually dispersed be honored.

[54] The lack of such a strategy so far, we should note, does not constitute a CSSP program shortfall. The contract did not specify any such goal.

[55] Some of these issues of course are already incorporated as subthemes into the human rights and conflict reduction initiatives, but in a full-blown civil society support effort, they would assume the place of major themes.

USAID-assisted civil society efforts in Papua fall into three types (at least from what we observed – there may be others we didn't see). First, there are constituency-based CSOs, which focus in significant part on the participation side of advocacy, endeavoring to mobilize and energize *adat* citizen groups to engage in the political process (AlDP and LPPMA). Second, there are local elite-managed "trustee" CSOs acting on behalf of unorganized constituencies (Foker, SKP and LPHP). And finally there is the weekly newspaper *Jubi*, pushing transparency and promoting a sense of Papuan consciousness and solidarity.

A principal task would be to select a lead organization to coordinate civil society efforts in the province. Doing so would mean a serious change of tactical direction for CSSP, in that instead of reacting to proposals generated from would-be grantees, it would itself be choosing the grantee, recruiting it and pressing a specific program agenda in initiating dialogue and negotiating with it. An alternative path might be to issue a request for applications or request for proposals, but the basic idea would be the same: to find an organization that would carry out a specific task rather than invite all organizations to propose activities they would like to undertake. Fortunately, given CSSP's experience in working with CSOs and the knowledge that it has built up in doing so, this switch should not be difficult to make.

In the Papua case, Foker seemed to the team to be a good candidate for such a task.[56] By its nature it is a kind of umbrella organization (the "fo" in the acronym stands for "forum"), and it has directed a Peace Campaign to defuse military-civilian conflict as well as an interfaith dialogue between Muslim and Christian communities in the region. Each of these efforts has proceeded at both provincial and at selected kabupaten levels. In addition, Foker has functioned as the financial manager for its subgrantees at the kabupaten level. Other USAID-supported groups by contrast appear more specialized into particular niches. Foker would thus appear better positioned to become the lead entity.

As the lead organization, Foker (or whatever other body is chosen) would be funded to launch a coordination effort involving like-minded CSOs, perhaps something on the order of a "human rights council" for the province, which would in turn become the strategic planning body for promoting human rights work in Papua. Such coalition or umbrella groups are not uncommon elsewhere in the region (e.g., Bangladesh, Philippines), so working models would be relatively easy to find and consult. In addition to strategic coordination, training would be a second clear priority for such a coordinating group. Over (not too long a) time, it should be possible with a ToT approach to build a Papua-based training capability that would offer the needed capacity building to provincial CSOs. The capacity building offered would be availed of by all three types of CSO – constituency-based, "trustee" and *Jubi*.

Sustainability poses a special problem for CSOs (and by extension CSO coalitions) concentrating on human rights. Unlike many other types of CSOs, those engaged in defending human rights are with rare exceptions inherently not self sustainable, for the constituencies benefiting from their work generally cannot provide the support needed to fund operations in their behalf. Some organizations like Amnesty International and Americas Watch have achieved self-reliance through a combination of foundational support and membership drives among interested citizens in the West, but such a model cannot be easily exported to places like Papua. In short, any hu-

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[56] Obviously the review team cannot substitute its judgment for that of CSSP and CPT here, particularly on the basis of a few days' visit in the field. Accordingly, our observations about Foker here amount only to what we hope are informed suggestions.

man rights apparatus erected in Papua cannot be expected to become self-reliant in the foreseeable future. Rather it will have to rely on outside funding. Accordingly, a principal challenge to CSSP/CPT will be to help create an ability to seek such funding on a continuing basis – from other donors, from international groups like Amnesty International, perhaps from foreign foundations.

As capacity increases in the human rights/conflict reduction arena, consideration should be given to expanding the scope to include other areas covered by USAID programs, in particular HIV/AIDS, which has assumed an explosive dimension in the province. Incidence is higher than anywhere else in the country and carries the threat of becoming a debilitating public health pandemic as it has in parts of Africa. FHI and its subgrantees in the province have made some headway in launching local advocacy initiatives aimed at prevention and are just beginning to consider efforts to build constituencies among victims and their families. Such groups could fruitfully be taken into the ambit of an expanded civil society coalition in Papua.

East Java. As the home of 15 CSSP-funded grantees (past, present and pipeline) as well as the City Forum program, East Java makes a clear choice to become the flagship for crafting a civil society strategy model having relevance for the vast majority of Indonesia's provinces that are not currently riven by conflict.

CSSP-assisted programs visited by the review team fall into several types. Two focus on transparency (LKM in Surabaya with its MediaWatch and YPSDI in Malang with its DPRD parliament watch effort), one promotes local advocacy within its constituency (Lakpesdam NU), and three deal with local governance issues (LPKP in Malang, YAPSEM in Lamongan and Bina Swagiri in Tuban). Among the CSSP-assisted NGOs not visited are groups concentrating on civic education, gender issues and farmer advocacy. And finally there is the CARE-supported City Forum program that is also a part of CSSP, focusing on building a dialogue between citizen groups and city governance institutions.

There is, in short, a wide range of programmatic initiatives, and even a predominant theme in the form of local governance issues, which at least 8 of the 16 past/present/future grantees take as their main interest. This certainly accords with the thematic foci on local governance and civic participation as determined by CSSP for the province. But there is not as yet an overall strategic approach to local governance or any other issue.[57] Nor are there any obvious candidates among the NGOs supported that could take the lead in forming an umbrella coalition which could then be tasked with formulating a strategic plan for the province.

Deciding on a strategic focus (which would in all likelihood be local governance), identifying a CSO (or forming a new one) to act as a coordinator and coalition-builder, and then strengthening the CSO and its coalition constitute the tasks for CSSP and CPT in East Java. With its 34 million people, 29 kabupaten (plus the eight independent kota), and (unlike Papua and Aceh) lack of abundantly obvious strategy choices, it will be more difficult to arrive at a strategic vision for the CSSP program in East Java. At the same time, the possible choices to make are considerably less somber, offering the opportunity to build rather than to safeguard and protect as in the other two locales.

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[57] As with the provincial program strategies, this lack of strategic focus was not included in the contract and so does not constitute a program shortfall.

Assuming that local governance in some form would become the central strategic focus of an East Java CSSP program, we would offer some suggestions as to how it might develop:

- Levels of emphasis. CSSP efforts presently focus on both kabupaten and village levels; this dual emphasis should be maintained.
- Constituency building. Only one of the CSSP grantees visited by the team appeared to be engaged in constituency building activities (Lakpasdam NU); the others seemed to have a trustee orientation (in particular the City Forums). But elites cannot carry local democracy by themselves very long. If democratic participation and accountability of CSOs to definite constituencies are to become the norm, more membership-based organizations will have to become players. CSOs should be encouraged to move in this direction.
- Program integration. For largely historical reasons, the CARE City Forums have operated more or less autonomously from the other CSSP-supported efforts in East Java. In the interest of building a provincial strategy, all CSSP activities should be integrated. The City Forum experience should inform the provincial model, and during remaining LOP they could benefit from lessons learned in other governance arenas in East Java (e.g., the BPD-oriented efforts of LPKP and YAPSEM).
- Links to DLG. The DLG team's Perform initiative should be linked to CSSP's drive to build a provincial civil society model. The review team was unable to discern exactly what differences exist between these two USAID-assisted programs, though we did get the impression that Perform is somewhat more oriented toward including constituency representation. In any event, there should be a much closer integration here between the SO7 and SO10 efforts in East Java.
- Financial sustainability. Given the shakeouts that are sure to occur as donor funding inevitably dries up, serious attention must be given to financial self-reliance approaches as one of the main foci of an East Java strategy. To hope for complete CSO self-reliance in the short term would be utopian, but the scope for attaining a significant degree of funding apart from donors is larger here than with the human rights CSOs that would form the centerpiece of Papuan and Acehnese strategies. Certainly at least some CSOs should be able to move beyond the 10% level of self-financing that is contemplated for year 5 in the CSSP contract as the benchmark for PO 3. A good number[58] of CSOs will need to have moved beyond that level by EOP if there is to be an optimistic long-term outlook for civil society in the province.

Issue 9 (added). Modifying the contract

If the main recommendations made in this report are followed, what would be the impact on the guidelines set out in the CSSP contract?

The principal recommendations of this report are to concentrate CSSP's energies in the remaining LOP toward creating a civil society program legacy in the three provinces of East Java, Papua and Aceh and toward institutionalizing civil society capacity building. In terms of the POs laid out in the contract, this would mean changing the direction of PO1, PO2 and PO3,

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[58] "A good number" should not be taken to mean all CSOs, or necessarily even a majority of them. What will be critical is that enough CSOs will have crafted various resource-generating approaches that the civil society community as a whole will possess the basic concepts of how to undertake this essential function. Practical knowledge about fund-raising will have to become widespread enough for the civil society community to survive.

while attenuating the momentum of PO4. The following formulations are only suggestions, but we hope that they convey the spirit of what we are recommending.

PO1. Strengthen civil society as a sector in three selected provinces so that it can begin to (1) function as a component of the local political system enhancing citizen participation and increasing governmental accountability to the citizenry, and (2) serve as a model for future programming efforts in other areas.

PO2. Improve indigenous NGO capacities to plan, administer and manage their activities and resources by (1) supporting individual NGOs in this regard and (2) strengthening in-country ability to provide technical assistance of this nature on a self-sustainable basis.

PO3. Designated NGOS will have developed an on-going capacity to generate resources from international and local sources to include income-generating activities.

PO4. Ongoing and present pipeline awards will be completed.

V. Principal recommendations

In this brief account, we pull together our major recommendations for CSSP during its remaining two years. There are a number of minor suggestions as well, but the ones offered here constitute the review team's main proposals, divided into three types. Each recommendation is linked back to earlier text where it is explained more fully.

Strategy

These recommendations pertain to basic program direction – what we believe should be its core focus over remaining LOP. Implementation will require action from both CPT and CSSP in all three cases.

- **Creating a program legacy.** It is time to pull together CSSP's experience at building civil society into coherent strategies that can form its legacy. The three provinces of Papua, Aceh and East Java offer an excellent opportunity for crafting three provincial strategic designs – the first two based on human rights and conflict reduction, and the third on local governance. Of the three components listed here in our strategic recommendations, this initiative should become CSSP's principal new activity during the program's last 2½ years. (See Issues 3 and 8).
- **Institutionalizing civil society capacity building.** Specific CSOs should be identified and assisted to become providers of TA to the civil society community in such areas as strategic planning, financial management, advocacy and the like. These "intermediate service providers" could then offer these services on a fee-for-service basis, which would also provide another avenue to ensure an ongoing CSSP legacy. This is our second priority for strategic programming over the remaining LOP (See Issue 4).
- **Maintaining media support.** A free media will remain critical to maintaining democracy in Indonesia, and support for it should be continued as our third priority. (See Issue 3).

Organization and management

The first of these recommendations applies to CSSP itself, the second to USAID/Jakarta and the third to relations between these two bodies.

- **Coordination among grantees.** Grantees both present and former should be encouraged to share experience and expertise in a structured fashion. MIRPP offers a good start in this direction but as yet is still quite embryonic; the concept should be pushed ahead into actuality. Smaller-scale MIRPP efforts along thematic lines should be pursued. (See Issue 5).
- **Coordination among SOs.** Significant economies of organizational scale stand to be realized at USAID/Jakarta through coordinating parallel efforts now being pursued among the various SO teams to upgrade the NGO community in such areas as financial management, workplan development, etc. In other areas like advocacy, the CPT SO team in particular might take the lead in sharing its expertise with others. But for coordination initiatives to succeed, interest in them would have to be built into the Mission's incentive structure for USDH and FSN personnel. (See Issue 6).

- **Modifying the contract.** Refashioning the POs in the ways recommended here would necessitate modifying the contract. (See Issue 9).

Operational level

Our last set of recommendations concerns how CSSP conducts its business and keeps track of how it does so. The first two pertain to CSSP, the last one to both CPT and CSSP.

- **Selecting grantees.** Impending budgetary cuts will likely decrease much of the PO4 effort after present pipeline grantees are funded. But to the extent that new grantees can be supported, a change of direction in determining them will be called for. To find lead CSOs for the provincial programs and civil society service providers at the national level, CSSP will have to identify grantees and solicit proposals for specific activities rather than let potential grantees find it. This latter approach has proven quite successful thus far, but a new one will now be needed. (See Issue 8).
- **Outreach efforts.** CSSP should be encouraged to increase its efforts at developing websites, publishing case study collections, guidebooks, etc. Newsbulletins outlining best practices in specific areas would be worth exploring. (See Issue 4).
- **The advocacy ladder.** We hope the advocacy ladder will prove a useful tool for gauging the progress of the civil society program in its final two years as well as for planning its programming initiatives for specific CSOs. (See PO1 analysis).

ANNEXES

Annex A.   Acronyms

AIDP	Aliansi Demokrasi untuk Papua
AMAN	Aliansi Masyarakat Nelayan
BPD	Badan Perwakilan Desa
CDIE	Center for Development Information and Evaluation
CF	City Forum
COP	Chief of Party
CPT	Civil Participation and Transition
CSSP	Civil Society Strengthening Program
CTO	Cognizant Technical Officer
DFID	Department for International Development (U.K.)
DG	Democracy and Governance
DLG	Decentralized Local Government
DPRD	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (National legislature)
DPRD	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Local Council/the legislature)
EOP	End of Project
FHI	Family Health International
FMS	Financial Management Specialist
Foker	Forum Kerjasama LSM se Irian Jaya
ForGRes Sidoarjo	Forum Gerakan Reformasi Sidoarjo (The city forum name in City of Sidoarjo)
FPMODa	Forum Partisipasi Masyarakat Otonomi Daerah
GOI	Government of Indonesia
GOLD	Governance and Local Democracy (project, Philippines)
IDEA	Institute of Development and Economic Analysis
IFES	International Foundation for Election Systems
INSIST	Institute for Social Transformation
ISAI	Institute Arus Informasi Indonesia
KKN	Korupsi Kolusi Nepotisme
KOAK	Komite Anti Korupsi
LAKPESDAM	Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia
LBBPJ	Lembaga Bina Benua Puti Jaji
LBH	Lembaga Bantuan Hukum
LBH	Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Papua
LEKSIP	Lembaga Konsultasi Perburuhan
LKM	Lembaga Konsumen Media
LOP	Length of Project
LP3ES	Lembaga Pendidikan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Ekonomi dan Sosial
LPKP	Lembaga Pengkajian Kemasyarakatan Pembangunan
LPPMA	Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Adat
MIRPP	Matching Issues People and Priorities
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama
PAKTA	Pengembangan Aktivitas Kemitraan Terpadu
Pemda	Pemerintah Daerah (Local Government/the executive)
PemDes	Pemerintah Desa
PERDA	Peraturan Daerah (Local Government Regulation/Act)
PO	Performance Objective

POKJA 30   Kelompok Kerja 30
PPC   Program and Policy Coordination (Bureau, USAID/Washington)
PRC   Proposal Review Committee
SAF   Special Activities Fund
SATUNAMA Yayasan Kesatuan Pelayanan Bersama
SEAPA   South East Asian Press Alliance
SPEKHAM   Solidaritas Perempuan Solo
SPEKTRA   Studi dan Pengembangan Ekonomi Kerakyatan
SKP   Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian
SO   Strategic Objective
SOW   Scope of Work
TA   Technical Assistance
TAF   The Asia Foundation
ToP   Technology of Participation
ToT   Training of Trainers
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme
WALHI   Wahana Lingkungan Hidup
YAPPIKA   Yayasan Aliansi Masyarakat Sipil untuk Demokrasi
YAPSEM   Yayasan Pengembangan Sosial Ekonomi Masyarakat
YASANTO   Yayasan Santo Antonio
YBML   Yayasan Bina Manusia dan Lingkungan
YLKI   Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia
YPRI   Yayasan Pendidikan Rakyat Indonesia
YPRK   Yayasan Pondok Rakyat Kreatif
YPSDI   Yayasan Pengembanga Sumber Daya Indonesia

Annex B. CSSP mid-term evaluation team interview log
(Location in Jakarta unless otherwise stated)

Date	Organization	Persons interviewed or occasion
19 Jun	Chemonics, Washington	Larry Morgan, Program Director, Asia Region Stephanie Archer & Shazia Pirani, Project Administrators Douglas Tinsler, Sr Vice President, Asia Region Michael McNulty, Asst Project Administrator
24 Jun	IFES, Washington	Mary Lou Schramm, Director, Asia Programs Jacqueline O'Connor, Program Officer Kellie Bethke, Pgm Assistant for Indonesia
26 Jun	Chemonics, Washington	John Strattner & Jennifer Brinkerhoff-Zengue Larry Morgan, Michael McNulty and Eileen ?
3 July	USAID/CPT	Richard Hough, Dy Director of Mission Michael Calavan, CPT team leader Robert Hansen, CSSP manager Sumali Ray-Ross, Program Office
3 July	USAID/HPN	Ratna Kurniawati, USAID mission Alphinus Kamboji, Save the Children Pat Madyana, Interfaith
3 July	USAID/NRM	Sheila Young, Energy team
3 July	USAID/DLG	Sri Pobo Sudarno, DLG team
3 & 4 July	CSSP	CSSP team
5 July	CARE	Bud Crandall, Country Director, Kusuma Adinugroho, Dy Director
5 July	SEAPA	Solahudin, Advocacy Coordinator
6 July	PAKTA	Rama Chandan, Executive Director Ferry Kurniawan, IT Consultant
8 July	CSSP/East Java	Sheila Town, Grant Manager
8 July	LAKPESDAM NU, Sido-arjo	Ahmad Muhidin, Vice-Chairman Hidayat, Chairman of HRD & Coordinator for CSSP grant Amirullah, Treasurer; Erma, Women Empowerment; Helmi, Director of Press; Zainul Arfin, Research; Yulia, Women Empowerment; Anas, Administrative Staff
8 July	Sidoarjo Kabupaten Pemda	Saiful Ilah, Wakil Bupati The council members (c 15)
8 July	Sidoarjo City Forum	Hariyadi and c. 12 other members
8 July	CARE office, Sidoarjo	Prabowo, Director, CARE/East Java Ir. Warman, Programme Leader, and 4 other professional staff
9 July	City Forum, Pamakesan	Nadir, chairman; plus 3 women members
9 July	Bupati, Pamakesan	Dwi Atmo Hadianto, Bupati; Ahmad Safei, Chair DPRD; Imam Safei, Chair city forum
9 July	LKM/Media Watch, Sura-baya	Tjuk Suwarsono, Director Henry Subiakto, Talk show host Chairul Anam, and Titin, Secretary
9 July	FKKP (Mojokerto City Forum)	Saifullah, FKKP; Nugraha, FKKP; Warman, CARE Jakarta; Hamidah, FKKP; Yazid, FKKP; Subari, CARE East Java; Sirmadji, CARE East Java; Anam Anis, FKKP

9 July	USAID-Perform Project, Malang	Farid Hadi Rahman, Partic Dev Specialist; Wasis, Financial Specialist; Dina, Coord. Adimistration
10 July	YAPSEM, Lamongan	
10 July	LAKPESDAM NU, La-mongan	Rupianto, Head of Student Union of Social & Political Sc. Afandi, Election Watch Committee Farid, Indonesian Muslim Student Movement Siti Rodyah, Sanitation & Health Ali, Chairman of Advocay & strengthening
10 July	Bina Swagiri, Tuban	Ismael, Executive Director Budi, Staff, Mukhtar, Staff; M. Wahid, BPD Chairman; Sukirman, BPD Chairman; Ansuro, BPD Chairman; Mustafa, BPD Chairman; Syafullah, BPD Chairman
10 July	LPKP, Malang	S. Suripan, Director Solaikan, Program Coordinator; Ngariono, Facilitator; Wiwit, a foun-der of LPKP
10 July	PPOTODA, Malang	Ibnu Tricahyo, Director & one other staff member
10 July	YPSDI, Malang	Ekosasmito, Executive Director Mssrs Yudi, Afan, Nuruddin, Eko Mmes Mujikartika, Henti, Kanti
11 July	LP3ES	Imam Ahmad, Director
11 July	Ford Foundation	Suzanne Siskel, Representative Hans Antlov, Program Officer
12 July	Asia Foundation	Doug Rammage, Director Katherine Hunter, Sr Director, Women's Partic Pgm Nilan Fernando, Asst Representative
12 July	ISAI	
12 July	Ausaid	Kim Henderson, 2nd Secy for Development Cooperation Irene Insandjaja, Pgm Manager
12 July	YAPPIKA	Arfzal Tjoetra, Network and Advocacy Manager
14 July	Mid-term review of UNDP Partnership Project	Paul Lundberg and David Watson, consultants
15 July	LEKSIP, Samarinda	Yakobus Beribe, Founder and Direcror Abdul Ismail A, Direktur LKP; Eva Victoria, Coord. Financial Divi-sion; Magdalena, Coord. Advocacy Division; Yusuf, Coord. PKBOB Division; Petrus L. Leyn, Director of Institution Development for La-bor Economic
15 July	Lembaga Bina Benua Puti Jaji (LBBPJ), Samarinda	M. Rudi Raneq, Director; Herman, Program Manager; Simon Sebo-raga, PIK; Priyama, PMA; Yuliana Husur, FD; Mendelsau, Personalia; Salvator Amir Riyantone, PIK Staff; Adriana Kila, PIK Staff; Supi-anto, Administration Staff; Florentina Kumla, Cashier
15 July	LEKSIP's Consituents, Samarinda	Karmani, OSKM Chairman; Samsu Arifin, SBSB Chairman; Ferry, SBD Chairman; Tarsan, SBGS Gerbak Sorong, Vice Chairman; Sha-ruddin, Serikat Buruh Dawood, Vice Chairman; Misransyah, SBMJ Mahakam Jaya, Chairman; Alfian Syah, SBMJ, Secretary
15 July	Foker, Jayapura	Bambung Sugiomo, deputy secretary; Md Ifan, *Jubi* editor; Yusak Rabe, Abraham; Golda Aronggear, pgm coordinator
15 July	Family Health Intl, Jayapura	Gunawara Ingkokusumo, Chief Representative, Papua Zaenel Abidin, Pgm Manager
15 July	AlDP, Merauke	Hawdin Holidi, Frans Kamedict, Theresia Esi Samkakai, Antonius So-rowai, Abdul Halil Hatala, Xaverius Songmen, Adam Jokor
16 July	POKJA 30, Samarinda	Kahar, Coordinator; Sukmto, Publication; Senei Han, Program Coordi-

		nator; Deni Yusuf, Book Keeper; Ardian Guruh, Field Staff; Firman Hidayat, Secretariat Coord.
16 July	YBML, Balikpapan	Poerwanto, Director; Jufriansyah, Coord. Program; Rifan, Financial Coordinator; Bambang, Campaign Staff; Satria, NRM; Idam, NRM; M. Nasir, Universitas Balikpapan
16 July	Bupati office, Merauke	Benjamin Siwatupang, Wakil Bupati
16 July	Police HQ, Merauke	Yul A. Prabuang, Wakapolres (Dy Police Chief)
16 July	Central mosque, Merauke	Helmi Chan, Chairman, MUI Abdul Halim, Member MUI and Chair of Muhammadiyah Harry Woersok, SKP Kevskupam Agung
16 July	YASANTO (FHI grantee), Merauke	Leo Ma and Francisca Nuhuyanan, lawyers working with YASANTO
16 July	Foker discussion group, Merauke	Samuel Oyab, local chair of Foker and head of YAPSEL, along with 17 others belonging to the Foker group in Merauke (including some assorted others)
17 July	AMAN, Balikpapan	Roeslan Rivai, Coordation Executive; Heri, Program Coordinator; Is-mail, Village Coord.; Rusdian, Financial Coord.; Ilham Jaya, Staff; Kaharuddin, Financial Staff
17 July	AlDP in Jayapura	Latifah Anum Siregar, chairwoman and 4 others, including Hadim from the AlDP meeting in Merauke
17 July	LPPMA in Jayapura	Yos Serontou, the chair, and 12 others
18 July	Arrive Yogyakarta	
18 July	YPRI, Jogja	Toto Rahardjo, Director; Doni, Education Coordinator; Dana, Secretary; Djoko, Facilitator; Dewi, Financial
18 July	Satu Nama, Jogja	Methodius, Executive Director; Hardono, Coord. Training; Heni, Training Division; Frans
18 July	INSIST, Jogja	Mansour Fakih, President; Toto Rahardjo; Dita
18 July	IDEA, Jogja	Dati Fatimah, Program Manager Rinto Waluyo, Filed Coordinator Broto, Finance Manager Farida, Campaign Program
18 July	SKP in Jayapura	Theo van den Broek, OFM, Director
18 July	LBH in Jayapura	Yvon Monim, Asst to division on women & children Robert Korwa, head of natural resources Jimmy Moya, head of administration Paseles Letsoin, head of personnel operationsf
19 July	USAID/CPT office	Nori Andriani, CSSP Grant Manager and Rodd Mc Gibbon, CPT Political Analyst
19 July	Rachmah Bararfie	CPT Grant Manager for E. Kalimantan
19 July	Jubi in Jayapura	Md Kholifan, Jubi editor Frits Ramanday, reporter and chair of AJI Papua branch Sali Pelu, operational editor Pustawati, financial manager
31 July	IFES	Alan Wall, Project Manager

Annex C. Scope of Work for Mid-Term Evaluation of USAID/Indonesia's Civil Society Support and Strengthening Program (CSSP)

BACKGROUND

The fluidity of the political environment in Indonesia and the magnitude of the nation's challenges requires the CPT program to be flexible and yet focused for the next few years. Given uncertainties in funding levels and the need to continually maximize synergy/impact and respond to new and often unforeseen opportunities, the Mission needs to critically assess on-going programs to ensure that they are strategic, cost-effective, realistic, synergistic and provide significant value added.

The Civil Society Support and Strengthening Program (CSSP) was designed as a direct contribution to USAID/Indonesia's Strategic Objective No.7 defined as "Democratic Reforms Sustained and Deepened." The Program targets the intermediate result that seeks to achieve "increased citizen participation in governance."

CSSP was awarded to Chemonics International, Inc. (the prime contractor) on the basis of a competitive procurement process and began operating in October 1999. Four sub-contracts were awarded to the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), CARE International, International Development Professionals (IDP), and the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE). The completion date of the Contract is September 30, 2004.

The USAID amount authorized for the CSSP Program is $27,438,990. To date $15,615,565 has been obligated. The Base Period of the contract is three years, and the Option Period for an additional two years was exercised in 2001. The principal revision (excluding obligations of funds) of the contract, in 2001, changed the budget from a CLIN-based budget to a cost-plus-fixed-fee line item budget, and increased the number of full-time professional staff allowed from 15 to 20.

The purpose of the Civil Society Support and Strengthening Program (CSSP) as stated in its contract is "…to help Indonesia during this historic period of transition from an authoritarian to a democratic society by assisting emerging, reform-minded non-governmental organizations (NGOs) address key issues associated with increased openness, transparency and reform."

The overall objective of the CSSP is that the contractor, at the end of the period of the contract, "…shall have strengthened a viable and influential group of Indonesian civil society organizations to the point where these groups can continue to work on policy dialogue with reduced USAID funding and participate effectively in policy making and implementation. In addition, the contractor shall assist Indonesian NGOs to raise certain key issues to the government, parliament, and broader society and help to ensure that these issues are resolved in favor of continued openness and democratic participation."

The CSSP contractor is responsible for achieving the following Performance Objectives, each of which has specific results targets or deliverables, and semi-annual benchmarks, described in the contract:

- (Performance Objective 1) "Strengthen the capacity of Indonesian NGOs to analyze needs and policy issues; articulate recommended reforms; successfully advocate for needed reforms; and help ensure effective implementation of those reforms";
- (Performance Objective 2) "Improve the ability of Indonesian NGOs to plan, administer and manage their activities and resources";
- (Performance Objective 3) "Designated Indonesian NGOs will be able to apply for and secure grant funding for the pursuit of their democracy-promotion activities from international donors and local sources. In addition, Indonesian NGOs will plan to [raise] and [will] raise funds through individual and institutional donations and other income-generating activities";
- (Performance Objective 4) Award and manage effectively approximately 10-15 small grants per year to selected Indonesian NGOs, and provide technical and administrative services to these grantees. (The target of 10-15 grants per year has been informally modified during Program implementation, and is discussed below.)

The CSSP contract consists of two parts: "…a technical assistance (TA) component and a grant component. The CSSP TA component includes the provision of long-and short-term advisors in specific technical fields, such as rule of law, ethnic reconciliation, civil-military relations, and policy implementation, and training. The grant component includes award and administration of grants to Indonesian NGOs." (Additional fields, such as local governance, improved facilitation skills, etc., have proven to be of greater relevance or more feasible during actual Program implementation than some of the examples cited in the contract.)

To facilitate implementation of the activities and efforts carried out under the Performance Objectives, the contractor manages a Special Activities Fund (SAF). Examples of activities funded by the SAF include: special studies; organizing and implementing conferences, seminars, workshops, training programs, etc.; limited commodity and technical support for cooperating organizations; production and printing of technical materials; and receiving and briefing visiting professionals.

In addition to the above responsibilities, the CSSP contractor provides, as necessary, technical and administrative support to USAID/Indonesia's Civic Participation and Transition (CPT) Team. (It should be noted that requests by CPT for such "support" have diminished over the course of the first half of the contract.) "The CPT Team is solely responsible for determining strategic plans and priorities, and maintaining policy relationships with grantees, Government of Indonesia, and political organizations." "In broad terms, the CPT Team [provides] the strategic framework, the funding levels, and the policy regulating the contractor's activities." The contractor is "…responsible for discrete activities, which are independent but supportive of day-to-day tasks" of the CPT Team and its individual members.

To accomplish these tasks, the CSSP contractor maintains an office, in Jakarta but off-site from the Embassy/USAID compound, that is currently staffed by approximately 30 persons (18 professional or technical, and 12 administrative or support), of whom seven are expatriates. A CSSP sub-office for East Java is maintained in Surabaya and is headed by an eighth expatriate.

Performance Information Sources: Following is a list of information sources that the evaluators should consult prior to conducting the evaluation: USAID/I Country Strategy Paper for democracy; the SO 7 Performance Monitoring Plan; CPT Achievement Reviews/Annual Reports; the CSSP Contract and amendments; CSSP yearly Work Plans, and annual Progress Reports; CSSP

Self-Evaluation (for January 2000 -- February 2001); and other referential or historic documents. (It should be noted that, starting in FY 2002), USAID's annual reporting system has been substantially modified, with significant implications for how the S.O. teams and their partners, such as CSSP, are to collect and report performance data.)

OBJECTIVES

The mid-term evaluation of CSSP should primarily focus on effectiveness and deliverables as stated in the contract, but also needs to address broader Mission management issues. The overall information will be helpful in making important management decisions regarding the relative value of CSSP's approach to grant making and CSO strengthening as compared with other existing approaches. The evaluation team should make recommendations as appropriate and identify potential corrective actions as needed.

The evaluation should also:

Assess the results for the first 2½ years of the CSSP Program in relation to the purpose and objectives as stipulated in the contract for the corresponding period;

Assess the services and assistance provided, and the impact or results achieved, to date for each of the four Performance Objectives, the Special Activities Fund (SAF), and the provision of technical and administrative support to the USAID/I CPT Team, as described in the Background section;

Assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the management and administration of the CSSP Program as provided by the prime contractor, Chemonics International, Inc., and the four subcontractors;

Make recommendations to the USAID for any mid-course corrections to the CSSP strategy, programs, management, staffing configuration, administration or budgeting necessary to achieve the end-of-program impact and results stipulated by the contract;

Make recommendations to the USAID/I CPT Team for modifications to CSSP's purpose, objectives and/or the reallocation of resources within the Program should the life-of-program funding be less than that projected at the start of CSSP.

STATEMENT OF WORK

This is an independent, mid-term evaluation of CSSP for USAID/Indonesia. The purpose of the evaluation is twofold: first, to assess the impact to date on the strengthening of Indonesian civil society organizations (CSOs) assisted by CSSP, and on the contribution of CSSP to an increased citizen participation in democratic governance; and second, based on these findings, to make recommendations for possible adjustments or corrections to enable the Program to achieve the maximum impact and contribution during its remaining 2½ years.

Context of the USAID/Indonesia Mission: The evaluation also provides the Mission with an opportunity to review in-depth CSSP's accomplishments and results to date and to determine if strategies pursued and lessons learned can improve our effectiveness and efficiency in strength-

ening CSOs and in advancing the Mission's broader objective of strengthening democratic governance in Indonesia.

Specific CSSP and Mission Management Issues:

1) Does CSSP's contract meet Indonesia's Civil Society and the Misson's current needs, priorities and objectives? If so how? If not, what corrective actions are needed?

2) What were the Mission's expectations for CSSP in terms of results and OYB levels and legacy mechanism? Are these expectations being met? If not, why not and what will be the implications?

3) In retrospect, how well did the original design (i.e. objectives, targets, technical issues to focus on, program management, staffing configuration, etc.) meet the needs over time? Has the focus of the activities actually shifted from that laid out in the RFP? In the contract?

4) Have activities not reflected in the contract (i.e. TA with the PMP, the R2, etc.) had a positive or negative impact on core/contractual program objectives?

5) Does CSSP view itself, and operate, as a partner, a direct/targeted implementing contractor or an autonomous donor?

6) Is CSSP responsive to the needs of the Mission, CPT, their consortium partners and grantees? Can collaboration among the different stakeholders be improved during the remainder of the program? If so, how?

7) How is CSSP coordinating with other Mission programs (e.g., CSSP's city forums links with DLG? The truth and reconciliation program with OTI and FFP?) to develop synergies that increase CSO performance and maximize the impact of resource allocations?

8) Currently, the Mission has three parallel grant making and TA/training programs within the CPT program (i.e. the CPT direct grants, The Asia Foundation and CSSP). Can comparisons be made about the effectiveness and usefulness of these programs, individually and collectively, in strengthening CSOs and in enhancing the Mission's achievement of developmental and foreign policy objectives?

9) CSSP currently provides grants for programs such as transparent, participatory governance (especially at local levels), human rights (such as those of disadvantaged groups including women and fisherfolk), media and inter-faith dialogue. How are these programs coordinated both with CPT and with other relevant offices in the Mission?

Context of the CSSP Program: It will be important for the evaluators to discuss CSSP program accomplishments and continuing challenges within the context of overall civil society development in Indonesia and the Mission's overarching democracy and governance strategy. Underlying issues, including the following, will need to be considered and incorporated into the discussion of the Program in order to fully understand and evaluate it: How has civil society developed since the fall of the New Order in 1998? Since the elections in 1999? What major obstacles

have existed and which have been overcome? What are the principal advances that have been made by CSOs that do advocacy, focusing on those that work within the areas of rule of law, citizen participation, better governance (national and local), human rights, the media, and women in democratic consolidation? What have been the relationships of civil society organizations with governments (national and sub-national) and the private sector? What are the perceived possibilities for the remainder of the Program for developing collaborative relationships among them? What are the perceived needs and priorities of civil society for the future? <u>This contextual information should be summarized in no more than four pages in the evaluation report.</u>

Assessment of CSSP's Overall Performance:

1)   How effective and efficient is CSSP in strengthening its "universe" of CSOs and in advancing USAID/Indonesia's broader objective of strengthening democratic governance in Indonesia?

2)   Are there signs of an improved enabling environment for civil society, and if so to what extent can they be attributed to CSSP interventions? Are there signs of a deterioration of the environment and, if so, can CSSP address them?

3)   Are there contrasting changes in the environments of USAID's (and CSSP's) six geographic focus regions -- West Java, East Java, North Sulawesi, Aceh, East Kalimantan and West Papua -- which would suggest a change in the mix of CSSP resources now flowing to them?

4)   What needs to be done to consolidate and increase CSSP's effectiveness and efficiency within the total amount of USAID resources to be made available to it if that amount is less than the estimated cost of the five-year Program?

5)   What overall results do we expect at the end of the contract? Under each of the objectives, it is important to assess how activities will enhance overall program effectiveness and responsiveness. How will performance be measured?

6)   How well has Chemonics implemented the contract? Are the benchmarks specific in nature? If not, do they need to be modified?

7)   During the first two years of the project, which benchmarks have been met? Which benchmarks have not been met and why?

8)   At the end of the contract, it is anticipated that there will be between 60 and 100 CSOs assisted (grants, TA and training). What impact will this assistance have and will it be sustainable after the contract ends?

9)   Is the overall objective of CSSP appropriate in scope? The evaluation should look at how CPT and CSSP define "viable and influential group of CSOs" and measure impact. This will have a direct bearing on how CSSP chooses its partners, provides TA, training and grants to them, and how sustainable they are once USAID funding ends. It will also impact on scaling up and replication of interventions.

10)   Under the contract have there been any major obstacles preventing CSSP from progress-
ing towards its objectives?

Assessment of CSSP's Objectives and Activities

1)   **Performance Objective No. 1 -- Strengthening CSO analysis, articulation and advo-
cacy for policy reform and implementation:** How have CSSP's TA, training and other
support affected the capabilities of CSOs to promote policy reforms and their implemen-
tation? How can the support be made more effective? In which policy areas has CSSP
been most/least successful, and how can any lessons learned be applied to the second half
of the Program?

2)   **Performance Objective No. 2 -- Effective CSO planning, administration and man-
agement:** Assess the Technical Assistance (TA) and training program effectiveness and
responsiveness to meet the capacity building needs of recipients, and how to improve it in
the second half of the Program. What is the quality and impact of technical assistance
and training being provided to participant organizations to build their capacities? Has the
appropriate TA been provided to CSSP grantees and other CSOs assisted by CSSP? Is
the TA and training program designed to have a lasting effect? Does it respond to inter-
ests and needs of participants? Are useful reference materials left behind? Is there effec-
tive and adequate follow-up? Does subsequent TA or training build on earlier efforts? Is
there significant participation by women?

3)   **Performance Objective No. 3 -- Increased capacity by CSOs to obtain funding and
to achieve sustainability:** It is important to review and measure whether the fund-raising
capacity of CSOs increase as a result of the TA, training and grants they receive. For ex-
ample, how many CSOs have secured funding from other sources, or can reasonably be
expected to secure such funding, as a result of CSSP's assistance? How much? What
measures are CSOs taking to improve their financial capabilities as a result of their par-
ticipation in the CSSP Program? Can the move towards greater self-reliance construc-
tively be accelerated over the next 2½ years as CSSP assistance winds down and is com-
pleted? If so, how? Given the absence of a tradition of corporate responsibility and phi-
lanthropy in Indonesia, what is the realistic expectation for this sector to help the CSOs
attain sustainability without compromising the latter's independence?

Grants to CSOs Awarded and Managed

$10 million of the $27 million estimated cost of the CSSP contract over its 5-year life is budg-
eted for grants to CSOs and NGOs; a total of 10-15 new grants per year (50-75 over the five
years) was projected at the start of the Program.

To date about 35 grants have been awarded, mostly to new or inexperienced organizations, for
support in the following broad subject areas: rights and equity issues; consumer and environ-
mental protection; transparent, participatory governance (especially local); and the media. The
focus of the majority of grants, including virtually all recent grants, is on one of the six geo-
graphic regions listed above; this is in accordance with the determination of the USAID Mission
in 2001 to begin concentrating the bulk of its resources in those priority regions.

In addition to the 35 grants already awarded, about another 37 grants have been approved conditionally and are in the design stage. Since it appears that CSSP and CPT decision makers are opting (consciously or otherwise) to award a larger number of smaller, cheaper grants (as opposed to a smaller number of larger, more-costly grants), it is probable that, with CSSP only half completed, the originally-expected maximum total of 75 grants will be substantially exceeded. Should this trend of awarding smaller, less costly grants be continued, or should the emphasis be on the larger, more costly ones? What are the advantages/disadvantages of each, and which approach will be the more effective? The more efficient?

Other issues:

1) What is the role of grant making in CSSP?

2) Does the original budgeted level for grants remain appropriate?

3) Is the grant making mechanism too cumbersome? If so, why, and what are the alternatives to continuing the mechanism during the balance of the contract period?

4) Does the mechanism take a disproportionate amount of staff time (CSSP's as well as CPT's) away from focusing on other elements of the program?

5) Since 80 - 90 percent of the grant funds have been or soon will be committed: Should CSSP continue to give grants in the last 2 years of the program even if they will not have time to evaluate impact? Given that the CSOs who have already received grants require significant TA, will there be sufficient time to provide the required TA to the additional grantees?

   If grant making remains a priority, do funds need to be reprogrammed in order to meet requirements for new grants in the next two years?

6) Is the current CSSP/CPT grant management system (two grant managers partnering per grant, one person each from CSSP and CPT) the most effective? What are the implications in terms of cost and accountability for decisions made?

7) Given the immense size, population and diversity of Indonesia, what is the utility and likely impact on civil society strengthening of providing grants to several dozen or more CSOs concentrated in six regions? Assess the grants objective in terms of its relevance to the other Performance Objectives and synergies between them and the grants. Are CSSP's human and financial resources sufficient to develop and monitor the grants portfolio in view of the very labor-intensive nature of the activity?

8) Cite examples of successful as well as "problem" grants and lessons learned from them that can be applied in the last half of CSSP. How can the grants component of CSSP be improved?

9) Is the screening and review process, including the operation of the Proposal Review Committee, appropriate, effective and efficient? What have been the critical assumptions underlying the grant selection process? Are RFA or Annual Program Statement mechanisms used? What are the implications of using each in terms of accountability, transpar-

ency, competition, and the environment in which CSSP and CPT have operated in Indonesia?

Monitoring and Evaluation:

1)	 Have grantees' performance monitoring, reporting and evaluative capabilities been improved as a result of CSSP's assistance to them? Does CSSP have an evaluation plan in place? If so, is it quantitative or qualitative in nature?

2)	Are issues of cost, financial diversification and institutional sustainability addressed in the plan? What evaluation criteria and indicators does CSSP utilize to measure results?

3)	Are indicators the same as CPT's? What management information system does CSSP currently have in place to collect and monitor the data? How often does the data get reported back to CPT and in what format? Has CSSP been monitoring and evaluating both its grants and TA/training (i.e. workshops and training) components of the contract?

4)	How will mid-term lessons learned be applied, documented and disseminated?

Special Activities Fund (SAF): Is there a measurable impact achieved by the SAF? Do the activities under it have an effect on any of the Performance Objectives? Which activities and why? Are corrections recommended to obtain the optimal value added from the SAF? Is it appropriate to increase the funding for SAF during the remainder of the program (to date about 50% of the $1.6 million budgeted for the life-of-program has been expended)?

Design, Management and Funding of CSSP:

Chemonics Program Management of CSSP: Has Chemonics' management structure been adequate and effective? Are the current staffing levels and the balance between expatriates and Indonesians appropriate? What have been the implications for the management of CSSP of the four sub-contracts? Unique contributions and/or value added by the inclusion of sub-contractors? Is there effective collaboration especially among the three principal consortium members (Chemonics, CARE and IFES)? How can CSSP and the Mission best use the institutional capacities of the consortium members to strengthen CSOs and minimize duplication of effort? Has the "Relationship between Contractor and USAID/I" clause as stated in the contract been effective in the management and implementation of the Program? How can program management be improved in the last 2½ years of the contract?

CSSP Funding and Budgeting: How cost-effective has CSSP been as a contract providing technical and administrative services to USAID/I? What proportion of CSSP funding is estimated to support these services to USAID/I and what proportion goes to the direct strengthening of civil society? Should adjustments in these ratios be made in the remainder of the contract and, if so, how? Given uncertainties with funding, and to maximize impact in the remaining 2 ½ years, how can CSSP prioritize and make decisions about types of activities, technical areas, partners, and numbers and configuration of staffing, etc.? The number of staff under the contract has increased from 15 to more than 30. What is the implication of this growth on program related costs, including overhead? Has the increase in staffing been warranted? If so, how? A brief cost effectiveness analysis should be done as part of the evaluation.

Due to accounting difficulties in attributing direct costs (salaries, travel, etc.) to the separate Performance Objectives, the CLIN budget was replaced in 2001 by a line item budget. This new budget, however, obscures the resources being devoted to each of the first three P.O.s (Advocacy; Capacity building; and Sustainability), although line items do remain for the SAF and the grants. The evaluation shall estimate the resources going
to each P.O. so as to determine if there are major deviations from the assumptions represented by the original contract budget.

The contractor has stated that additional funding (above the contract's estimated cost of $27.43 million) would be necessary to meet the needs of USAID programs (other than CPT's) were substantial new work to be required of it in support of those programs, as only with the most stringent budgeting will the contractor be able to achieve all contractual objectives at the $27.43 million level. The evaluation shall recommend how to reduce costs to stay within the contract budget while causing the least possible diminution of the Program's impact and results and the maximum possible synergy among the various Mission programs and strategic objectives in which the development of a democratic civil society is important. How can CSSP be given scope to supplement its USAID resources with funding from other sources, thus enhancing its overall impact on the development of civil society?

Methodology

1. The evaluation contractor shall review background information including the documents listed previously in the Background section.

2. The evaluation contractor shall conduct an extensive review of the work carried out by the Program in order to assess progress toward the established overall result and the objectives, the effectiveness of overall Program strategy and Chemonics' management to date, and make recommendations for improvements for the last half of the Program. This review will include meetings with USAID/Indonesia representatives, Chemonics staff in Washington, CSSP staff in Jakarta and Surabaya, civil society representatives (including but not limited to CSO recipients of grants; see below), and other donors active in civil society development in Indonesia.

3. The evaluation contractor shall interview a minimum of 20 CSO recipients of CSSP grants, selected to ensure coverage of all major sectoral areas of focus, including a substantial number of CSOs from at least two geographic focus regions outside Jakarta. The evaluation contractor will consult closely with the USAID CPT Team in choosing CSSP grantees for interviews to ensure balanced coverage, including exposure to organizations with differing perspectives of their relationships with CSSP. Members of the CPT Team, including the Team Leader and/or the CTO for CSSP, and/or representatives of other Mission Teams may accompany the contractor to various organizations in Jakarta and in the field. Where appropriate, CSO interviews may be combined in focus groups.

Illustrative Schedule of Work

The field work shall begin no later than June, 2002. Five workdays will be required in Washington of the team leader prior to departure, for appointments with Chemonics' CSSP project officer, CSSP sub-contractor representatives and USAID/W DCHA/DG's civil society team; for collection and review of documents; and for preparation of a draft work plan and methodology. The

field evaluation will require a minimum of 24 workdays (4 six-day weeks) in Indonesia for each of the team members. Finally, up to 5 days will be required in Washington of the team leader in order to complete the final report. The team will conduct entry and exit briefings to be attended by Mission management, CPT and other Mission offices..

Deliverables

The evaluation contractor shall submit the following deliverables to the USAID/I CPT Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO):

Work Plan and Methodology: A detailed written draft work plan and methodology submitted upon the evaluation team's arrival in Indonesia.

Draft Report: By the close of business on Wednesday of week four of work the evaluation team shall submit a draft report including findings, conclusions and recommendations to USAID and conduct a briefing for USAID on the contents. USAID shall provide written comments and issues to the evaluation team leader. Following the submission and briefing of USAID but before the team's departure from Indonesia, the team also will conduct a courtesy briefing for CSSP concerning findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluators that are not specific to Mission-management issues. If input on the draft report raises concerns which the team is unable or unwilling to address in the final report, such concerns shall be contained in a written addendum reproducing the language of the written input, together with a brief statement from the evaluation team leader explaining why the concern was not addressed in the final report.

Final Report: Within two weeks (ten work days) after receipt of USAID's inputs, the contractor shall deliver the final report to the CPT CTO. The report becomes the property of USAID/I. Fifteen (15) hard copies and an electronic file version in Microsoft Word must be submitted to USAID/I. The contractor will not circulate or distribute any report until formal approval is received from USAID.

Report Format and Content:

The final report shall contain an executive summary (three pages maximum); table of contents; main text including findings, conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations (35 pages maximum, single-spaced); and annexes including the evaluation Scope of Work, description of the methodology used, lists of individuals and organizations consulted, and bibliography of documents reviewed.

The report shall comprehensively and separately address the issues (both general and specific) listed in the Statement of Work, and ensure that the overall objectives of the evaluation (described in the "Objectives" section) are fulfilled by the contents of the report. The report shall be structured so that interpretations, findings, conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations are clearly backed by the underlying factual, descriptive information to support them. The report's executive summary shall accurately represent the report as a whole.

Team Composition and Qualifications

The evaluation will be carried out by a four person contract team under a USAID IQC Delivery Order. The team shall include:

(1) A team leader with a professional background in international development work specializing in strengthening of civil society. This person shall be responsible for coordinating and directing the overall evaluation effort, including preparation and submission of the draft and final evaluation reports to USAID/Jakarta. He/she should have a minimum of 15 years experience in the design, implementation, and evaluation of foreign assistance programs including USAID related civil society programs, especially with demonstrable experience in transitional, post-authoritarian settings. At least 5 years of that experience should be focused on Southeast Asia. As assessment team leader, the incumbent should be thoroughly familiar with techniques of program impact evaluations and possess good organization and team-building skills. Knowledge of spoken and written Bahasa Indonesia is preferable.

(2) The second team member should be a Southeast or South Asia national based in the region (but outside Indonesia), possess strong background knowledge of the region, substantial work experience in civil society development and strengthening, and knowledge of evaluation principles and methods. S/he will be fluent in English and preferably have a working knowledge of Bahasa Indonesia.

(3) The third and fourth team members should be Indonesian nationals resident in the country, possess substantial experience in development work including civil society strengthening, and be familiar with evaluation principles and methods. They will have organizational and facilitation skills. In addition to Bahasa Indonesia they will have a command of written and spoken English.

Each team member should possess an advanced degree (Masters or above) or equivalent based on relevant professional work experience. Strong writing and word processing skills are a requirement.

USAID/Jakarta may appoint a Mission employee to act in the capacity of an observer or consultant where appropriate. The contractor will guarantee that substitutions will not be made for individuals selected as team members without the approval of USAID/Jakarta.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

All logistical support will be provided by the contractor to include travel, transportation, secretarial and office support, interpretation, communication and report printing, as appropriate.

TECHNICAL DIRECTION

Technical direction will be provided by Robert R. Hansen, USAID/Jakarta Cognizant Technical Officer for the CSSP Program, (62-21) 3435-9423 or 9447, rhansen@usaid.gov.

Annex D. References

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[59] The quarterly and annual reports noted here were supplemented by many internal reports, memos, outlines, etc.,
which CSSP generously shared with the review team.

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Annex E. Email Comment

-----Original Message-----
From: Peter Harris [mailto:pharris@cssp.or.id]
Sent: 27 September 2002 14:58
To: Hansen, Robert
Cc: alene mcmahon (E-mail); roshana cohen (E-mail)
Subject: RE: Final Report -- CSSP Mid-term Evaluation

Dear Bob

We have decided after discussion and reflection that we accept most of the main findings and rec-
ommendations of
the evaluation, a number of which have already been integrated into the draft contract modification
we discussed
yesterday, and welcome its comments and suggestions. Under the circumstances we do not see a
need for further
comments or responses, though we do appreciate being given the opportunity to make them.

Peter Harris